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I. INTRODUCTION

The law encourages the settlement of lawsuits, grants patents to
encourage investment in innovation, and forbids firms from dividing
markets. At their core, these three policies seek common goals-the
efficient use of resources and the encouragement of output-maximizing
competition in the marketplace.' But when it comes to the settlement of
patent lawsuits between competitors, the three policies may come into
conflict Particularly when competitors settle a patent infringement action
by the patentee paying the alleged infringer to discontinue the allegedly
infringing use, the interests in encouraging settlements and patent rights
may be vindicated, but serious antitrust concerns are raised?
The antitrust problem may be simply stated. An "exit payment"4 by an
incumbent firm to an actual or potential competitor to exit the relevant
market is a naked horizontal market-division agreement that is per se
illegal. The payment represents a sharing of the incumbent firm's
monopoly profits with the potential new entrant for the purpose of
preserving the monopoly and the attendant monopoly rents, which results
in restrictions on output and deadweight social losses. Consumers pay
more and buy less while the conspirators trade in monopoly profits. This
is the paradigmatic evil forbidden by section 1 of the Sherman Act5 and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act.'
On the other hand, settlement agreements are voluntary, paretooptimal,7 and presumptively efficient arrangements that public policy
typically encourages. Like patent and antitrust law, the law of contracts-

1. It is generally recognized that antitrust and patent law, although polar opposites in their
WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND
ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 1 (1973).
2. For a discussion of historic patterns in the regulatory policy regarding patents and
antitrust, see Steven P. Reynolds, Antitrust and Patent Licensing: Cycles of Enforcement and
Current Policy, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 129 (1997).
3. The same concerns would be raised if the alleged infringer brought a declaratory
judgment action to declare the patent invalid or its own use non-infringing.
4. This Article refers to payments from the patentee to the alleged infringer as "exit
payments," although, if the alleged infringer has not yet entered the market and is, therefore, just
an imminent infringer, the payment would more accurately be characterized as a "no-entry"
payment. Either way, the same antitrust issues are presented.

treatment of monopolies, share common objectives. E.g.,

5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
6. Id. § 45. The FTC, which has been particularly active in investigating and challenging
patent infringement settlements, enforces only the FTC Act, not the Sherman Act. See FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948). However, the FTC Act has been held to comprehend all
conduct that is illegal under the Sherman Act. Id.
7. A contractual condition is pareto-optimal if prohibiting that condition would make every
affected party worse off.
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including settlements-is designed to increase social welfare by
facilitating the creation of wealth through consensual transactions.' A rule
strictly prohibiting payments to settle patent litigation may mean that firms
must engage in expensive and inefficient litigation to resolve a patent
dispute even though they might be able to avoid the cost of protracted
litigation through a settlement. The cost of patent litigation, which may
frequently amount to many millions of dollars, will be passed on to
consumers like any other cost. In addition to these direct costs of litigation,
the mandatory information sharing that occurs in discovery may impose
indirect costs, such as freeriding on competitor trade secrets or implicit
collusion due to excessive sharing of pricing, capacity, or output level
information. Further, exit payments may themselves have some
procompetitive effects, such as enabling the alleged infringer to "invent
around" the patent.
To date, most articulated positions about the legality of patent
infringement settlements-whether in legal literature, court opinions, or
statements by the antitrust enforcement agencies-have addressed the
competing public policies favoring settlements and disfavoring market
division. They have overlooked a crucial third side to the public policy
triangle-the effect of legal rules regarding patent infringement
settlements on the wealth-creating incentives established by the patent
laws. For example, restrictive rules regarding patent infringement
settlements may create super-optimal uncertainty regarding patent rights
leading to sub-optimal inventive activity or delays in the marketing ofnoninfringing substitutes. Additionally, these rules could force patent
litigants-often horizontal competitors-into licensing relationships that
may impose greater social costs than exit payments. Thus, rules restricting
patent infringement settlements out of courtesy to the Sherman Act or FTC
Act may inadvertently undermine the goals of the Patent Act9 or of the
competition laws themselves.
The approaches reflected in the legal literature, case law, and
enforcement agency positions have not provided a satisfactory explanation
of the interrelationship between the pro-patent, pro-settlement, and antimarket-division public policies. The difficulty in articulating a coherent
position on exit payments stems from incoherence in the prevailing legal
test on patent settlements in general-whether the parties acted in "good
faith" in settling.'0 By drawing on a legal test that focuses on the subjective
intentions of the settling parties, the law has taken offense at exit payments

8. See Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Intellectual Property and Antitrust
Limitations on Contract, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY: TECHNOLOGY,

INNOVATION, AND ANTITRUST ISSUES 231 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001).
9. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).

10. See generally United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
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which superficially appear to preserve monopoly rents, the very evil
forbidden by the Sherman Act."
This Article argues that public policy toward exit payments in patent
infringement settlements should not focus myopically on the framework
of the antitrust laws and the costs imposed by monopolies. It should take
into account and balance all three relevant social policies-procompetition, pro-patent, and pro-settlement-and formulate rules leading
to the lowest net social cost when all relevant costs are factored. This
Article argues that the optimal rule would permit exit payment settlements
when the ex ante likelihood of success of the patentee's infringement suit
is high and prohibit them when the ex ante probability of success is low.
At the same time, the legal system must make this ex antejudgment on a
true ex ante, abbreviated basis without requiring a full trial on the merits.
Otherwise, the legal system would be effectively adopting a per se antiexit-payment rule. The challenge is to find suitable mechanisms for quick,
efficient, and reasonably accurate judicial predictions of the outcome of
unfinished patent infringement lawsuits.
Part II of this Article addresses the costs of market division agreements,
on the one hand, and of rules prohibiting exit payments, on the other. It
also addresses a misconception that has worked its way into some of the
emerging law-overemphasis on the direction in which payment flows in
the settlement (i.e., from the patentee to the alleged infringer, or vice
versa). Part III first discusses the inadequacies of the existing "good faith"
approach to analyzing patent infringement settlements. It then suggests
some criteria that courts and the agencies could employ to make ex ante
judgments about the merits of patent infringement lawsuits and, hence, to
approve or disapprove exit payment settlements.
II. THE COSTS OF PROHIBITING OR PERMITTING EXIT PAYMENTS
Antitrust concerns in the settlement of patent disputes are not of recent
vintage.' 2 But the intensity of concern in the courts and antitrust

11. For a discussion of the prevailing dim view on exit payments, see Kevin D. McDonald,
PatentSettlements and Payments That Flow the "Wrong" Way: The EarlyHistory of a Bad Idea,
15 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON. 2 (2002).
12. The issues have been recognized by a growing number of commentators. See David A.
Balto, PharmaceuticalPatent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321 (2000);
Mark Crane & Malcolm R. Pfunder, Antitrust and Res JudicataConsiderationsin the Settlement
ofPatentLitigation, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 151 (1993); Carole E. Handler, Antitrust Implications of
Settlement and Patent Disputes, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2001, at 483 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No. 658, 2001); Robert
J. Hoerner, Antitrust Pitfalls in Patent Litigation Settlement Agreements, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 113
(1998); Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in Settlement of PharmaceuticalPatent Disputes, 14
ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON. 4 (Winter 2000/2001); Robert P. Taylor, PatentSettlements as
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enforcement agencies seems to be growing, particularly in the
pharmaceutical industry where fierce competition between brand-name and
generic manufacturers for burgeoning health care dollars and
complications from the Hatch-Waxman Act 3 have led to a flurry of
activity in the courts and the enforcement agencies) 4 Courts, the antitrust
enforcement agencies, and commentators confronted with antitrust issues
involving patent settlements have struggled through the confusing
intersection of the public policies favoring settlements and patents and
disfavoring monopolies. The conclusions they have reached in attempting
to reconcile these policies generally have failed to take full account of the
competing strains in these policies.
Three public policies converge-and compete-when patentees and
alleged infringers settle an infringement dispute: (1) patent rights are
favored; (2) settlements are favored; and (3) market division between
horizontal competitors is disfavored. The majority of the articulated
positions on the legality of exit payments settlements have treated such
settlements as involving a conflict between the pro-settlement and antimarket division principles, but have failed to take into account the costs of
legal rules regarding settlements on the incentive system established by the
patent laws themselves. They have considered, at most, two sides of the
triangle, leaving out a crucial side.
As Louis Kaplow has shown, a patent system should seek to strike the
optimal balance between rewarding the patentee's inventive efforts and
minimizing the losses imposed on society as result of the patent

Antitrust Conspiracies,at 151 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course,
Handbook Series No. 617, Sept. 2000).
13. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc
(1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994)).
14. In two recent cases, discussed more fully below, the FTC filed complaints against brandname and generic drug manufacturers concerning patent infringement settlements. See In re Abbott
Labs. & GenevaPharmaceuticals, No. C-3945, 2000 FTC LEXIS 65, at*6-11 (FTC May 22,2000)
(alleging illegal agreement between brand-name and generic makers ofterazosin hydorchloride for
generic manufacturer to discontinue production in exchange for $4.5 million monthly payment);
FTC v. Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293, 2000 LEXIS 16, at * 1-12 (FTC Mar. 16, 2000) (alleging
illegal agreement between brand-name and generic makers ofCardizem CD and generic equivalent
whereby generic firm agreed not to market the product during the pendency of patent litigation in
exchange for $ 0 million quarterly payment). On April 2, 2001, the FTC filed a complaint alleging
that the brand-name maker of K-Dur paid two generic competitors to stay off the market during the
settlement of a patent lawsuit. See FTC Charges Schering-Ploughover Allegedly Anticompetitive
Agreements with Two Other Drug Manufacturers (Apr. 2, 2001), at www.ftc.gov/opa/
2001/04/schering.htm. Further, the FTC has reportedly launched a general investigation of
settlement practices between generic and brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers. Politics &
Policy: FTC Receives Approval to Investigate GenericDrugDeals, 6 AM. POL. NETWORK 9 (Apr.
11,2001).
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monopoly. 5 In order to understand the net social consequences of a legal
rule regarding patents and achieve the optimal ratio, equal attention must
be given to the numerator (monopoly losses imposed on society) and the
denominator (the legal rule's effect on inventive activity). 6 A liberal rule
with respect to patent settlements might have a large positive effect on
inventive activity and impose relatively few social costs--or vice versa.
Understanding that relationship is crucial to formulating appropriate rules
about patent settlements.
This part addresses the costs of liberal or restrictive rules on patent
settlements, and their effects on the social policies regarding patents,
settlements, and market division. In doing so, it takes the three policies as
endogenous. The policy against market division is firmly embedded in
Section 1of the Sherman Act, the pro-settlement policy has been expressed
in countless court opinions, 7 and the Constitution itself expresses the propatent policy.'" None of these policies is free from controversy. Some have
questioned the assumption that a patent system increases social wealth and
argue, to the contrary, that a patent system creates artificial monopolies 9
or arbitrarily rewards the last-leg inventor.2" Others have challenged the
assumption that settlements should be favored, showing that they may lead
to a sub-optimal amount of deterrence, 2 1 or generally lead to unjust
results.22 A vocal few have even questioned the Sherman Act's prohibition
of market division.23 Thus, it would be plausible to address the interaction
15. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection:A Reappraisal,97 HARV. L. REV. 1813
(1984).
16. Id. at 1842.
17. E.g., McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde & River Don Castings Ltd., 511 U.S. 202,215 (1994)
("[P]ublic policy wisely encourages settlements."); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) ("The
plain purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid litigation."). The Sixth Circuit has
observed that settlements are particularly encouraged in patent litigation "the nature of which is
often inordinately complex and time consuming." Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368,
1372 (6th Cir. 1976).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
19. See, e.g., Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory ConcerningPatentsfor Inventions, I
ECONoMICA 30, 40-42 (1934).
20. See, e.g., FRANK HYNEMAN KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 184-94 (8th ed.
1957). It has also been suggested that competition for patent monopolies eats away the social gains
that patents are supposed to achieve. Roger L. Beck, Competitionfor Patent Monopolies, in 3
RESEARCH INLAW AND ECONOMICS 91 (Richard 0. Zerbe Jr., ed., 1981).
21. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The DeterrentEffects of Settlements and
Trials, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 109 (1988).
22. Owen Fiss offered a classic retort to the legal establishment's overwhelmingly prosettlement sentiment in his aptly titled Against Settlement: "[S]ettlement is a capitulation to the
conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised." Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); see generallyJules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice
in Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 102 (1986).
23. For example, Dominick Armentano argues that market division agreements tend to break
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between the three policies at the point of their convergence by attacking
the basis of one policy or the other instead of trying to reconcile them.
The purpose of this Article, however, is to reconcile the three policies
on their own terms, and thus takes the three policies as given. The effort
is to understand the costs imposed by legal rules regarding patent
settlements, and to propose solutions that achieve the optimal balance
given the present legal framework and ground rules. To this end, the
following sub-parts describe the social costs that would accrue if exit
payments in patent settlements were freely permitted, on the one hand, or
completely prohibited, on the other.
A. The Costs of Market-DivisionAgreements
Absent any overlay of the patent laws, there would be no question that
an agreement between two competitors for one to exit a particular market24
in order to enable the other to earn monopoly rents and then share those
monopoly rents with the exiting firm would be per se illegal under Section
1 of the Sherman Act.25 If the exit of the second firm caused the remaining

firm to obtain a monopoly in the relevant market, the costs of permitting
such an agreement would be the garden-variety deadweight losses familiar
in the antitrust literature.26 Indeed, naked market-division agreements may
be more socially costly than naked price-fixing agreements. Whereas

apart of their own weight "when they are inappropriate," and that the costs of prohibiting such
agreements (as well as any other horizontal agreements) outweigh the benefits. DOMINICK T.
ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASEFOR REPEAL 64 (1986). Armentano's position enjoys
little support among even the most aggressive curbers of antitrust. E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY OF WAR WITH ITSELF 268 (Free Press 1993) (1978) (observing
that "[tihe efficiencies arising from a naked price-fixing or market-division agreement, if any ever
do arise, must be so minor that the law is justified in ignoring them").
24. Similar concerns arise when horizontal competitors stop short of agreeing that one will
exit a market, but instead agree that they will not compete on certain technologies. That was the
case in Pet Inc. v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 1252 (W.D. Mich. 1975), where the
parties-manufacturers of open-front refrigerated display cases-agreed that they would "not
depart from [their] present engineering and manufacturing know-how" in the production of their
respective products. Id.at 1254. The district court found this agreement not anticompetitive since
the parties remained free to compete in the relevant market, and simply agreed not to infringe each
other's patented features. Id.But the fact that two patentees remained competitors to some degree
does not answer the question whether the agreement could be anticompetitive (i.e., if each
patentee's infringement claims were unmeritorious). By limiting competition for innovation, the
settling parties could make consumers worse off than they would be absent the agreement, even if
the settling parties continued to compete on price.
25. The Supreme Court has consistently held various forms of market division per se illegal.
E.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); United States v. Citizens S. Nat'l Bank, 422
U.S. 86 (1975); United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
26. E.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 1.3b, at 19-20 (2d ed. 1994).
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members of a price-fixing cartel may compete on a non-price basis,2 7 a
monopolist faces no similar restraint on its behavior.28
Patentees are legal monopolists who enjoy the same sort of monopoly
rents as firms that gain market power through predation, merger to
monopoly, or other anticompetitive means. The difference, of course, is
that society tolerates the deadweight losses imposed by the patent because
of the belief that the patentee would not have created the new invention at
all absent the carrot of legally sanctioned monopoly rents.29 Society is
deemed better off with an innovative monopolist than with no monopolist
at all.3 °
But society is best off if only the firms that actually create new
inventions are rewarded with monopoly rents. Thus, the doctrine of "prior
art" separates the true inventors from the copycats, limiting the monopoly
reward to those who created genuinely new forms of wealth.3' Similarly,
society is best off if even genuine inventors are only able to claim
monopoly rents within the scope of their patent and not claim a broad
curtilage around the patent. Thus, even where the patent is good, excessive
deadweight losses occur when the patentee succeeds in pushing a noninfringer out of the market based on an erroneous claim of infringement.32
A legal regime that could instantaneously and costlessly distinguish
invalid patents from valid patents and infringing uses from non-infringing
uses would have little reason to tolerate patent infringement settlements
that included an agreement by the alleged infringer to exit the market or
what is essentially practical equivalent-to stipulate to ajudgment finding
an infringement.33 Even where the probability that the alleged infringer
would prevail and thereby be able to remain in the market was small, that

27. See George J. Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competition, 76 J. POL. ECON. 149, 152
(1968).
28. Further, cartels are inherently less stable than single-firm monopolies due to "divergent
interests, strong temptations to cheat on the cartel price, non-price competition, and changes in
market shares." PHILIP E. AREEDA ET AL., 2 ANTITRUST LAW 405b, at 25 (1995).
29. Or, at least, this is the modem justification. The Framers of the Constitution apparently
focused less on the benefits to society than on giving a fair reward to the inventor. See Gwendolyn
Dawson, Note, Matchmaking in the Realm of Patents:A Callfor the Marriageof Patent Theory
and Claim Construction Procedure,79 TEx. L. REV. 1257, 1258 (2001).
30. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, § 1.3b, at 19 (noting that although monopoly imposes
a social cost, society may be better off with the monopolist than without if the monopolist produces
a good that was unavailable before the monopolist began to market it).
31. See generally Note, PriorArt in the Patent Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1959).
32. Defenses to patent infringement claims typically fall into one of two categories: (1) the
patent is invalid or unenforceable, or (2) the defendant's use does not infringe. See 35 U.S.C. § 282
(listing defenses to a claim of patent infringement).
33. The only exception would be the case where the useful life of the patent was about to
expire due to technological or other changes, or the legal term of the patent was about to expire,
meaning that the patentee could not thereafter charge monopoly rents.
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slight chance would justify making the costless legal determination. Say,
for example, that behind the veil of ignorance 4a before making the
instantaneous and costless legal determination-the monopolist had a 99%
chance of succeeding on its infringement claim and thereby driving the
infringer from the market. If the deadweight loss attributable to the
monopolist's success in its infringement action were $1000, the social
value of requiring the determination of the infringement claim would be
$10. Since the hypothetical determination would be costless, it would be
socially optimal to forbid the settlement and require the determinationunless the very fact of making the determination imposed some nontransactional cost."
The leading articulation of the view that patent infringement
settlements are presumptively suspect because they rob the public of the
opportunity to test the validity of patent claims-and therefore potentially
to avoid the monopoly costs of patents-is found in Justice White's
concurring opinion in United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.36 In
Singer, two of the settling parties had competing patent claims pending in
the United States Patent Office, and it appeared that the patent office
would declare an interference, leading to an adversary proceeding for the
determination of relative priority.37 If the interference proceedings had
gone forward, one of the parties might have "draw[n] additional prior art
to the attention of the Patent Office," which might have resulted in neither
party acquiring a patent. 8 By settling, the parties lessened the probability
that the patent office would deny their applications based on prior art.39
According to Justice White, the settlement therefore robbed the public
of the opportunity to have the competing parties mutually void or limit one
another's applications:
In itself the desire to secure broad claims in a patent may
well be unexceptionable-when purely unilateral action is
involved. And the settlement of an interference in which the
only interests at stake are those of the adversaries, as in the
case of a dispute over relative priority only and where
possible invalidity, because of known prior art, is not
involved, may well be consistent with the general policy

34. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).

35. As discussed infra part II(C)(1), restrictive infringement settlement rules may impose
non-transactional costs, such as sub-optimal innovation due to risk aversity or delay due to
uncertainty. This hypothetical avoids the delay due to uncertainty cost by specifying that the legal
determination could be instantaneous, although it does not avoid the risk aversity cost.
36. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 197-200 (1963) (White, J., concurring).

37. Id. at 198 (White, J., concurring).
38. Id. (White, J., concurring).

39. See id. (White, J., concurring).
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favoring settlement oflitigation. But the present case involves
a less innocuous setting. Singer and Gegauf agreed to settle an
interference, at least in part, to prevent an open fight over
validity. There is a public interest here,.., which the parties
have subordinated to their private ends-the public interest in
granting patent monopolies only when the progress of the
useful arts and of science will be furthered because as the
consideration for its grant the public is given a novel and
useful invention.40
This is an overly simplistic reason for disapproving a settlement. While
the public has an interest in eliminating patent claims that freeride on prior
art and create no novel form of wealth, it does not have an undifferentiated
interest in challenging patent applications. Patent applications involving
arguable prior art are unlike intentional torts that are incapable of being
overdeterred since they have no social value. 4' An increased rate of
challenges to patent applications might create a super-optimal number of
false negatives--denials of patent applications based on erroneous finding
of prior art. That, in turn, could lead to sub-optimal investment in
innovation.
Further, since legal determinations regarding patent validity or
infringement are neither instantaneous nor costless, the relevant legal rule
must take into account not only the expected cost of exit by alleged
infringers without judicial determination of the merits (i.e., probability of
successful defense x deadweight social losses), but also the transactional
and non-transactional costs imposed by a rule restricting such settlements.
As the Sixth Circuit noted in enforcing a settlement agreement in a patent
lawsuit, the "interest, reflected in the Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, is equally
injured when invalid patents are held valid as when valid patents are held
42
invalid.,
While a decreased rate of challenges might create a super-optimal
number of false positives--erroneously issued patents-one would have
to assess the relative costs and benefits of more or fewer challenges to
patents to formulate the appropriate legal rule. An undifferentiated public
interest in testing the validity ofpatent claims, however, does not, standing
alone, provide a coherent basis for prohibiting settlement agreements
regarding patent disputes.

40. Id. at 199 (citations omitted) (White, J.,
concurring).
41. William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, I INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 127, 136 (1981) (arguing that intentional torts should be sanctioned without
concern for overdeterrrence).
42. Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1373 n.3 (6th Cir. 1976).
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B. The Costs of PatentLitigation
If patent settlements impose social costs, so do protracted patent
lawsuits. These costs can be classified into two categories--costs directly
and immediately attributable to the litigation and indirect or consequential
costs.
1. Direct Costs of Patent Litigation
Anyone who has ever been involved in a patent infringement lawsuit
knows that "patent litigation is a very costly process."43 Attorneys and
experts must be hired and associated litigation costs incurred. According
to a 1999 study by the Intellectual Property Law Association, the median
total cost through the end of suit for patent litigation where the dollar
amount at risk is $10-$100 million is $2,225,000.44 Just to take the case
through discovery costs $1,491 000
The costs of litigation to parties involves more than the costs of
retaining attorneys and experts and paying for court costs, copying
expenses, and transcripts. Litigation also drains away firm resources by
requiring managers and other employees to focus time and attention on the
litigation, instead of ordinary firm business. 46 For every hour that a lawyer
spends preparing for, taking, or defending a deposition, the client often
spends an hour in fact-gathering or being deposed.47
Patent litigation imposes costs not only on parties, but also on courts.
For every incremental dollar spent in litigation by the litigants, additional
costs are often incurred by the judicial system as well.48 Thus, a rule that
requires parties to litigate instead of settling thus imposes substantial direct
costs on the court system and on the taxpayers who fund the system.
2. Indirect Costs of Patent Litigation
In addition to these direct costs, a rule curtailing the ability of a
patentee to settle with an alleged infringer-thus increasing the duration
and intensity of litigation-increases the likelihood that competitors will
gain access to one another's trade secrets through the discovery process.
Under the liberal rules of discovery, competitors in litigation may request

43. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971).
44. ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY: THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO PROFITING FROM
PATENT PORTFOLIOS 15 (2000).

45. Id.
46. Id. at 17-18 (discussing the indirect costs of patent litigation).
47. See id. at 18.
48. A rule restraining the ability of potential patentees to settle a priority action may impose

similar incremental costs on the patent office.
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one another's most sensitive trade secrets, including marketing studies,
pricing information, and customer lists.49
The mandatory sharing of such information during discovery may
impose a variety of social costs."0 For example, it may enable either the
alleged infringer or the patentee to freeride on its competitor's trade
secrets, such as internal research and development or manufacturing and
marketing processes." Mandatory information sharing may thus destroy
some of the incentive reward of developing more efficient means of
innovation, production, or distribution. As with the patent laws themselves,
the ex post effect of such freeriding may be socially beneficial, but the ex
ante effects of non-protective rules on incentives are socially costly. 2 This
is particularly true in patent-intensive industries characterized by high
fixed costs, relatively few firms, and frequent patent litigation. Legal rules
extending the duration and intensity of litigation may cause competitor
firms to lose confidence in the confidentiality of their internal processes
and therefore to invest sub-optimally in these processes. 3
Additionally, antitrust law generally disfavors information exchange by
competitors on the theory that it may facilitate price-fixing or conscious
parallelism. 4 The mere exchange of pricing information by competitors

49. The Federal Circuit has attempted to draw some boundaries around what confidential
information is discoverable in patent litigation-particularly from third parties. See Micro Motion,
Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., 894 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quashing third-party subpoena
seeking, among other things, comparative test results, sales figures, and customer lists on ground
that -discovery sought was not relevant to the litigation). However, the court also recognized that
information of this type might be discoverable, depending on the plaintiff's articulated theory of
liability or damages. Id. at 1326.
50. See Omri Ben-Sharar& Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interestin ContractLaw, 109 YALE
L.J. 1885, 1886 (2000).
51. Professors Ben-Shahar and Bernstein have shown that the mandatory revealing of
information in discovery may impose significant costs on contracting parties, such as damaging
bargaining positions*in future negotiations, engaging in profitable holdup with respect to other
executory contracts, or weakening the producing party's position with respect to third-parties such
as banks, unions, insurance companies, and secured creditors. Id.
52. Trade secret law "grants indefinite legal protection to a monopoly" with an incentive
objective similar to that of the patent laws. Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Lav
and Regulation, 23 N.M. L. REv. 1, 11 (1993). Trade secret protection thus shares the tension
inherent in the patent laws-a justification based on ex ante incentives counterbalanced by
substantial ex post social costs.
53. Mandatory information exchange by competitors in discovery may undo the social
benefits sought to be achieved by trade secret law-preventing competitor freeriding. See Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfus, DethroningLear: Licensee Estoppelandthe Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV.
677, 732 (1986).
54. For a general discussion of, and partial rebuttal to, objections to information exchange
by competitors, see David J. Teece, Information Sharing,Innovation, andAntitrust,62 ANTITRUST
L.J. 465 (1994).
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may violate the antitrust laws." In patent litigation, all of the patentee's
and alleged infringer's pricing, cost, and output level information may be
relevant to the calculation of damages, and therefore discoverable in
litigation. 6 Thus, a rule curtailing early settlements out of antitrust fears
may unwittingly facilitate the very sort of information exchange among
competitors that would otherwise be illegal.5 7
Some of the potential social costs of mandatory information exchange
by competitors may be minimized by protective orders that limit lawyers'
and experts' access to certain categories of information and that restrict the
use of exchanged documents, interrogatory answers, deposition or trial
testimony, and expert reports to litigation purposes.58 But protective orders
are often porous and difficult to enforce59 and it is difficult to predict when
they will be granted." Thus, while protective orders may assuage concerns
in individual cases, it would be nafve to rely on the theoretical availability
and enforceability of protective orders as a ground for disregarding the
social costs imposed by mandatory information sharing in discovery. The
problem is further aggravated by the nature of the rule extending the period
of litigation and, accordingly, the average volume of information
exchanged between horizontal competitors.
C. The Innovation Costs of ProhibitingExit Payments
As discussed in the preceding part, protracted patent litigation imposes
direct and indirect social costs. These are costs that accrue whatever the
reason for the protraction in the litigation-whether due to a rule
restricting settlements or simply to the parties' differing evaluation of their
55. See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969).
56. For example, in order to establish damages the patentee may be required to show that
there was a drop in the price of its product attributable to the alleged infringer's entry into the
market. See Nat'l Research Labs. v. Eppert Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d 851, 861-62 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(granting summary judgment against patentee who failed to establish that drop in price of its
product was attributable to defendant's distribution of the allegedly infringing product).
57. Whether permitting exit payment settlements would eliminate the social costs of
information exchange in discovery in a particular case depends, of course, on whether the
settlement would otherwisehave occurredbefore the socially costly information-sharing took place.
58. The Manual on Complex Litigation provides that blanket protective orders should
ordinarily be employed in patent litigation and that "[d]isclosure of particularly sensitive
information-such as production processes and customer information-may be restricted to counsel
and their experts ..... JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE: MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 33.64, at 363 (3d ed. 1995). However, the Manual also provides that
"counsel should exercise restraint in designating materials as confidential." Id.
59. See Alan Lawrence, The Value ofCopyrightLaw as a Deterrentto DiscoveryAbuse, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565 (1989) (arguing that protective orders are "highly unreliable" for the
protection of trade secrets because they may be subject to modification or complete withdrawal by
courts, and breaches are difficult to police and punish).
60. See Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1922.
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legal positions, differing strategic objectives, emotional or irrational
considerations, lawyer incompetence, or simple obstinacy. This part
discusses additional costs that are particular to a rule prohibiting exit
payments.
1. Risk Aversion
A rule prohibiting exit payments may have the unintended effect of
increasing the risks of engaging in inventive activity, and therefore lead to
a sub-optimal amount of innovation. At least one major goal of patent law
is to give firms an optimal set of incentives to engage in research,
development, and innovation.6 The innovation interests in granting patent
owners a monopoly incentive must be considered ex ante-thatis, it must
be evaluated on the basis of the inventor's incentives before she undertakes
the inventive activity. After the creation of the protected patent
right-while the patentee is enjoying the monopoly fruits of her investment
in research and development--everyone except the monopolist would be
better off if the incumbent firm's invention were available free of charge
to competitors. But the patentee would not have created the invention at
issue had it not been for her ex ante expectation of legal protection from
free-riding.62
A firm will sink funds into research and development when the present
value of the expected future income stream from the developed product
meets or exceeds its development and production costs. 3 In calculating the
expected future income stream of the product, the firm will take into
account the possibility that, even if the product is successfully developed
and profitably marketed," a court will declare that the patent is invalid
(thus destroying the monopoly right) or that a new entrant's use is noninfringing (thus undermining the value of the patent in securing monopoly
rents). In considering whether to sink funds into a particular research and
development project, a firm will thus discount its expected future income
stream from the product by the likelihood of a legal determination that the
patent is invalid or that another firm's use, undermining the monopoly
value of the patent, is non-infringing.

61. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
62. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1838 ("[I]nventors' decisions to undertake inventive
activity are based on their perceptions of potential rewards before they undertake the activity, not
on the reward they in fact receive afterward.").
63. The likelihood that a firm will obtain a patent is strongly correlated with the amount of
its research and development expenditures. See F.M. Scherer, The Propensityto Patent, I INT'L J.
OF INDUS. ORG. 107 (1983).

64. For every product successfully marketed and developed, millions of dollars are sunk into
researching applications that are never successfully brought to the market.
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There is no loss in efficiency from the firm considering ex ante that a
court may destroy the monopoly value of its patent through a declaration
of non-infringement or invalidity. If a patent is invalid or a competing use
is non-infringing, there is a social cost to permitting the patentee to
continue enjoying monopoly rents. In that case, the patentee has not
created the wealth that it claims in the patent and enforcement ofthe patent
would cause deadweight losses (in the case of invalidity) or stymie
innovation (in the case of non-infringement). The incumbent firm's
consideration of the possibility of a declaration of invalidity or noninfringement is necessary to achieve the optimal amount of research and
development by matching greater amounts of investment in invention with
the development of inventions that are more likely to be deemed
patentable.
But while a firm considering expending costs in inventive activities
should consider the risk of patent invalidity in deciding whether--or how
much-to invest in innovation, a rule prohibiting exit payment settlements
may lead to sub-optimal investment in research and development due to
the firm's aversity to risk. For example, assume that Firm A's expected
profits from a particular patent are equal to $1200, before accounting for
the possibility that the patent will be declared invalid or that a close
competing use will be declared non-infringing. Assume that the possibility
of a declaration of invalidity or non-infringement is 20% and that, in such
an event, the firm's revenues from the patented product will be $200. The
firm's expected monopoly rents from the patent are $800.65 In deciding
whether to invest in research and development, a firm that is risk-neutral
will be indifferent as to whether it can settle patent lawsuits by paying its
competitor to stay out of the market (putting aside the question of litigation
costs). The risk-neutral patentee would be willing to settle the patent
lawsuit for up to $400 (assuming that the first lawsuit will conclusively
establish the scope and validity of the patent and that there will not be
subsequent challenges). But most inventors, even firms with some appetite
for risk and speculative investment in new inventions, are not perfectly
risk-neutral when it comes to possible litigation outcomes.66 Particularly
65. Ex ante, every patentee's claim of entitlement to monopoly rests in a zone of probability
greater than zero and less than 100%. The inherent lack of certainty regarding the outcome of a
future legal proceeding is due to limitations on information, evolution in legal standards and market
circumstances, and the possibility of legal error.
66. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 447, 478 (5th ed. 1998). In
general, corporations behave in a less risk-averse fashion than individuals, although individual firm
managers with significant wealth locked up in the corporation may continue to exhibit a low
tolerance for risk. Id.Inventors-whether individual or corporate-may be less risk-averse than the
general population, since the outcome of research and development is often unpredictable although
the rewards may be high. See Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed ReDefinition of "Firstto Invent," 49 ALA. L. REv. 755, 808 (1998) (asserting that "inventors are
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where the divergence between the possible outcomes is significant-$200
or $1200-firms might seek to insure against the possibility of losing their
entire investment.67 The option to settle patent lawsuits is a form of
insurance against that risk.68
The option to settle patent lawsuits, then, is a valuable right that will
make a risk-averse inventor more likely to commit capital to patentable
research and development projects.6 9 Conversely, the absence of that
option will make risk-averse firms somewhat less likely to commit capital
to research and development projects.70 The absence of a non-entry
settlement right, therefore, imposes a social cost: some firms will be less
likely to commit capital to potentially productive research and
development, which is the goal of the patent laws.
2. Uncertainty and Delay in New Research and Development
A rule constricting the ability of a patentee to compromise its
infringement claim by paying the alleged infringer to exit the market may
have an adverse effect on innovation by extending the period of
uncertainty around the parties' respective rights to develop and market the
patented product or allegedly infringing product. In particular, an extended
period of litigation may cause the alleged infringer to forestall "inventing
around"'" the patent, pending the outcome of the litigation.
An example is illustrative. Firm A, a pharmaceutical company,
produces a drug under its brand name. Firm B attempts to market a generic
version of the same drug. Firm A sues, alleging infringement of its patented

likely among the least risk-averse people on the planet").
67. See Steven N.S. Cheung, PropertyRights and Invention, in 8 RESEARCH INLAW AND
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 5, 14 (John Palmer & Richard 0.
Zerber, Jr. eds., 1986). Steven Cheung has observed that the high costs of infringement suits are
due largely to the uncertainty of court interpretation on questions of validity and infringement and
"greatly reduce the value of patents." Id.
68. See Jeffrey M. Perloff& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Settlements in PrivateAntitrust Litigation,
in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 149, 149-50 (Lawrence J.
White ed. 1988).
69. See III PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF

ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 707g, at 182 (1996) ("Uncertainty as to the
validity and coverage of many patents makes dispute inevitable and settlement prudent.").
70. See ERICH KAUFER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 35 (1989). Erich Kaufer
has observed that a competitor's potential challenge to the legality of the incumbent firm's patent
may weaken the incentive to engage in welfare-maximizing innovation, thus requiring an extension
in the life of the patent. Id.
7.1. See Dreyfus, supra note 53, at 765 n.200. A firm "invents around" a patent by creating
a non-infringing substitute for the patented product or process. Where an infringement claim is
invalid, requiring the alleged infringer to invent around the patent imposes unnecessary duplication
costs, although the process of inventing around may itself bring about superior innovations. Id.
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formula. Firm A is unable to obtain a preliminary injunction, and the
litigation proceeds on the merits.
Firm B now faces a difficult choice whether to (1) proceed with the
marketing of its generic equivalent during the pendency of the litigation;
(2) maintain the status quo during the pendency of the lawsuit; or (3)
attempt to invent around the patent and create a non-infringing substitute.
Assume that B's expected net annual income from being able to market a
generic version of the product equals $1000. However, since A is entitled
to monopoly profit damages if it ultimately prevails at trial, B faces a
potential liability of $2000 per year of infringement.' But if B invested in
research and development to invent around the patent, it could devise a
clearly non-infringing substitute for $4000 and be on the market with a
non-infringing product possibly before the outcome of the litigation.
Whether B will market the allegedly infringing product, attempt to
invent around A's patent, or wait for the outcome of the litigation depends
on several variables, including the strength ofA's infringement claims, the
expected duration of the lawsuit, the expected length of time it will take to
bring a clearly non-infringing product to market after sinking research and
development costs, and the expected useful life and income stream of the
substitute product it might develop.73 Assume that the probability that A
will prevail at trial is 50% and that a trial and appeal will not be completed
for three years after the denial ofthe motion for preliminary injunction. B's
expected value from marketing the product during the pendency of the
lawsuit equals its expected cost from A's winning an adverse judgment and

72. The patent statute provides that damages in a patent infringement action must be
"adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court."
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). The Supreme Court has defined the recoverable damages as "compensation
for the pecuniary loss [that the patentee] has suffered from the infringement, without regard to the
question whether the defendant has gained or lost by his unlawful acts." Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S.
565, 582 (1895). The question to be determined is "had the Infringer not infringed, what would
[the] Patent Holder-licensee have made?" Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476, 507 (1964) (quotation omitted). Thus, the patentee is generally entitled to recover its lost
monopoly profits from the alleged infringer. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing &
Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1990). For a general discussion of patent
damages, see Laura B. Pincus, The Computation of Damages in Patent Infringement Actions, 5
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 95 (1991); see also Robert S. Frank, Jr., & Denise W. DeFranco, Patent
Infringement Damages:A BriefSummary, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 281 (2000).
73. See Ariel Pakes & Mark Schankerman, The Rate of Obsolecence of Patents, Research
GestationLags, and the PrivateRate of Return to Research Resources, in R&D, PATENTS, AND
PRODUCTIVITY 73 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984). According to Pakes and Schankerman, the average
patent has an economic life of 4 years, with a confidence interval between 2.8 and 5.6 years. Id.
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damages award.74 Thus, its expected value from either marketing the drug
or not marketing the drug is zero for three years.
On the other hand, it can incur $4000 in sunk research and development
costs in year one, invent around the drug, and then realize $1000 in profits
in years two and three. But whether or not it will do so depends on both the
expected long-term value of the new product and B's expected value from
being able to continue the allegedly infringing use (presumably at low
marginal cost) in the years following the conclusion of the litigation.
Although, given this scenario, B's expected value from marketing the
allegedly infringing product is zero in each year of the pending litigation
due to the offsetting possibility of damages, in the years following the
expected conclusion of the lawsuit, B's expected value is positive-$500.7 5
Given these facts, B has an expected positive income flow from
marketing the drug in the years following the termination of the litigation,
whether or not it invests in research and development to invent around the
patent. Whether it makes the research and development investment
depends on the expected useful life of the non-infringing substitute
following
end of the lawsuit. In order for B to make the investment, the
"value
of the
the future
income stream attributable to the research and
development investment must exceed the value of marketing the drug in
the years following the end of the lawsuit using the allegedly infringing
formula. Thus, (putting aside time-value issues) if B expected to generate
profits of $500 for five years following the termination of the litigation if
it did not invest in a new product, its expected value if it did not invest in
research and development would be $2500. Conversely, if it would take
two years after investing in research and development to roll out a noninfringing product at a cost of $4000, with a useful life thereafter of six
years and per annum profits of $1000, the firm's expected value in
investing in the new product would be $2000. Since Firm B's profit would
be $2500 without the investment, the investment would not occur, and the
firm would simply stay offthe market until the conclusion of the litigation.
Under this scenario, consumers would lose at least a year of having a
low-cost generic on the market. Indeed, if B put off investing in research
and development for a non-infringing mechanism until the conclusion of
the lawsuit, and then lost on the merits, it might never develop the noninfringing mechanism and market a generic equivalent. Depending on the
particular values at issue, B might conclude by the end of the litigation that
the useful life of any new product it might develop would be too short to
justify the research and development costs.
74. In each year it markets the allegedly infringing drug, B earns $1000 in net income. But
it also incurs 50% of $2000 in expected liability.
75. If B wins the infringement lawsuit, it will be able to reap $1000 in profits each year with
no prospect of offsetting liability.
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A scenario such as this might be averted ifA were permitted to buy out

the value of B's non-infringement or invalidity defense early in the
litigation. With the uncertainty regarding the future income stream from
exploiting the allegedly infringing use removed, B might move more
quickly to invent around the patent. Further, B would have ready capital
-a settlement payment-with which to begin its investment. A legal
regime forbidding cash payments from the incumbent firm to the alleged
infringer early in the litigation may stifle innovation in non-infringing uses,
and thereby unwittingly extend the term of the patentee's monopoly.76
D. The Costs of MandatingOne-Way Flow ofPayments

A principal objection to settlement payments by an incumbent firm to
a potential new entrant to drop a non-infringement or invalidity
counterclaim is that such payments flow in the wrong direction.77 The
underlying assumption is that exit payments represent a naked sharing of
monopoly rents. On the other hand, payments by a defendant to license
proprietary rights are perceived as an agreement to allow competition for
the patented product that will increase output of the product.7" Similarly,
payments by the alleged patent infringer to the patentee in settlement of the
infringement claim are viewed as legitimate compensation for the wrongful
loss of monopoly rents to which the patentee was entitled. Both of these
conceptions are off the mark.
1. Licensing Agreement Settlements
Due to the concerns over exit payment settlements discussed in Part
II(A), it might be tempting to formulate the following rule in trying to
balance these concerns with the law's generally pro-settlement policy: If
the patentee needs to give the alleged infringer something of value in order
to achieve a settlement vindicating its patent rights, it should grant the
alleged infiinger a license (presumably at a discounted price to reflect the
controversy between the parties) to use the patented art. One problem with
such a rule, however, is that patent license agreements between horizontal
competitors may themselves be problematic insofar as they will give the
patentee control over the licensee's output and possibly control over

76. One difficulty with this scenario is the likelihood that, if the defendant is able to

efficiently invent around the patent, the patentee may not see the patent as conferring a monopoly
benefit at all, and thus may not be willing to share monopoly rents in exchange for a cease and
desist order against the defendant's allegedly infringing use. On the other hand, the alleged
infringer's ability to compete around the patent may be a trade secret kept from the patentee.
77. See infratext accompanying notes 93-117.
78. See infratext accompanying notes 79-89.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 3
FLORIDA 14W REVIEW[5

[Vol. 54

pricing levels.79 For example, a recently filed lawsuit by seventeen
consumer groups alleged that a patent infringement lawsuit by the brandname manufacturer of the cancer drug Tamoxifen was settled with a
licensing agreement whereby the generib manufacturer agreed to market
the brand-name firm's drug rather than produce its own version.80
According to news media reports, the agreement resulted in the marketing
of the generic version at a price 5% less than the brand-name price,
whereas most generics sell their drugs at a price 30% to 80% lower than
the brand-name price."
Cross-licenses are similarly suspect. The Department of Justice and
FTC guidelines for the licensing of intellectual property state that the
agencies are likely to challenge settlements involving the cross-licensing
of intellectual property "[i]n the absence of offsetting efficiencies." 82
Patent licensing, particularly cross-licensing or patent pooling, may be
disproportionately represented in Department of Justice lawsuits
concerning the use of patents.8 3
It is unnecessary here to develop the arguments concerning the
anticompetitive potential of patent licensing. Licensing agreement
settlements in which an alleged infringer pays the patentee a royalty to use
the patented art clearly give rise to antitrust concerns compared with a
baseline of complete competition between the patentee and the licensee."
The more significant question for purposes of this Article is whether they
also may impose greater social costs than settlement payments in which the

79. In United States v. GeneralElectric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), the Court held that a
patentee may dictate the price at which the licensee can sell. Id. at 491. Subsequent cases have
narrowed the General Electric holding to the point where its continued validity is in doubt. See
generally Robert P. Taylor, Licensing in Theory andPractice:Licensor-Licensee Relationships,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 561, 584-90 (1985).
80. Melody Peterson, Suits Accuse Drug Makers of Keeping Generics Off Market, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2001 at CI.
81. Id.
82. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5, at 28 (1995).

83. Christopher D. Hall, Patents, Licensing, and Antitrust, in RESEARCH IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 79 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe,
Jr. eds., 1986).
84. The patentee may act as the manager of a price-fixing cartel, ostensibly settling patent
infringement claims with its competitors by licensing its patented technology, collecting some
insignificant royalty, and then setting the prices charged by other manufacturers. See United States
v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 202-03 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Further, in the case of a cross-license, the
licensed technology may be such an important aspect of the parties' business that the licensing
agreement acts as a de facto technical merger ofthe companies. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Sperry Rand
Corp., No. 4-67 Civ. 138, 1973 WL 903, at *53 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 1973) (finding that crosslicensing patent settlement agreement between Sperry Rand and IBM was a defacto technical
merger that realized in a dulling of each party's incentive to innovate).
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patentee pays the alleged infringer to quit an allegedly infringing use. In
some circumstances, at least, the answer is yes.
a. Licensing an Irresponsible Steward or Freerider
It is in the interest of the patentee to have its patented product produced
and distributed in the most efficient manner possible. Thus, a patentee will
typically license another firm to produce or distribute its product if the
licensee can perform those tasks more efficiently than the patentee."
Conversely, the patentee typically will not license its product if it is able
to produce or distribute its product more efficiently than a potential
licensee.
These rules apply with equal force in the patent infringement settlement
context. In determining whether to settle an infringement lawsuit through
a licensing agreement, the patentee and alleged infringer will consider not
only the costs and risks of litigation but also the respective value to them
of the proposed licensing agreement. The transfer ofrights associated with
a licensing agreement may have relatively little value to a firm that can
produce or distribute the patented product less efficiently than the
patentee.86 Although in the context of a settlement agreement the licensing
royalty will be discounted to take into account the probability that the
defendant will prevail on the merits and thereby be able to continue its
present use without paying any royalty, even the discounted royalty
payment may not provide a sufficient incentive for the alleged infringer to
forgo its right to insist that its present use-without any associated royalty
cost-is non-infringing. This is especially likely to be the case where the
alleged infringer is more efficient at producing or distributing the allegedly
infringing item than it would be at producing or distributing the item under
the terms of a license agreement.
On the other hand, the patentee may be reluctant to license its patent to
a firm that may not safeguard the patent's goodwill with the same care as
the patentee. Misuse of the patented product by a licensee can diminish the
reputational strength of the patent for the patentee as well." This is
particularly likely where the license is of a shorter duration than the
expected useful life of the patent.
For example, assume that Firm A holds a patent on a flashlight bulb
with an average life of two years. The patent itself has an expected useful

85. Bowman, supra note 1, at 70; Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1856.
86. The license may still be valuable if the licensee can sub-license to a third-party who is
able to make more efficient use of the invention than either the licensee or the patentee.
87. Mark S. Holmes, PatentLicensing 2000, § 10.3 (PLI Patent Licensing Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. 644, 2000) (noting that "many licensors have been shocked by the behavior
of licensees they had assumed were upstanding").
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life often years-meaning that Firm A will expect to make sales to repeat
customers. Firm B produces a competing bulb using allegedly infringing
technology. During settlement discussions, Firm B demands a two-year
license in exchange for discontinuing its present use. Firm A may be
unwilling to grant such a license, because Firm B's incentives with respect
to its treatment of the patent will be different from A's. Whereas A will
seek to preserve the patent's goodwill by assuring quality and thereby
repeat customers, B may seek to maximize first-time sales without regard
to the customers' satisfaction during their use of the product. 8
Similarly, the patentee may be reluctant to license the patent to a firm
that might freeride off the patentee's efforts to exploit the patent.89 Even
under a royalty agreement where a percentage of the licensee's sales must
be remitted to the patentee, every dollar that the patentee spends on
advertising or promotional efforts will produce an added income stream
not only to the patentee by increasing its own direct sales and its royalties
from the licensee, but also to the licensee. Thus, particularly where
information costs are high and advertising or marketing is a substantial
component of the patentee's cost structure, the patentee may be reluctant
to license its patent to another firm. Given the inefficiencies that may arise
from licensing, a firm that is faced with a choice of either settling through
licensing or not settling at all may chose the latter option, even though an
otherwise socially optimal payment could be reached if a payment by the
patentee to the alleged infringer were permitted.
b. Creating Disincentives to "Invent Around the Patent"
An alleged infringer who pays a royalty for use of the patent may be
unlikely to attempt to invent around the patent but instead to seek to reap
its share of the monopoly (or duopoly) rents associated with the patent.90
On the other hand, where the patentee pays the alleged infringer to
discontinue the allegedly infringing use, the patentee will still have an
incentive to invent around the patent-particularly given the monopoly
rents that the patentee will continue to generate once the infringement suit
is settled.
Whether or not the settling alleged infringer will seek to invent around
the patent depends on a number of factors, but especially the possibility
and cost of inventing around the patent and the wording of the settlement
88. Firm A might seek to alleviate this concern by granting Firm B a license equal to the
expected useful life of the patent and thereby aligning Firm B's interest with its own.
89. See William F. Baxter & Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a Consistent Theory of the Welfare
Analysis ofAgreements, 47 STAN. L. REV. 615,628 (1995) (discussing licensee freerider problems).
90. Royalty rates for patent licenses tend to lie in the range of 1% to 10%, with an average
of 3% to 4%. ERICH KAUFER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYsTEM 24 (1989). Licensors
usually appropriate a third to a half of the benefit to the licensee for using the patented product. Id.
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agreement or stipulated injunction. In some situations the specific patented
use may be practically impossible to invent around due to technological
constraints, prohibitive costs, or network effects associated with a first
mover advantage.91 Under those circumstances, licensing settlements may
generally impose fewer social costs than cash payments by the patentee to
the alleged infringer to exit the market.
Similarly, the patentee who pays the alleged infringer to cease and
desist the allegedly infringing use may attempt to draft the settlement
agreement or stipulated injunction in such a way as to prevent effective
inventing around the patent. The patentee may insist on wording in the
defendant's stipulation to stretch the scope of the patent or admit that
potentially competing devices or processes infringe when it is questionable
whether they do. Indeed, where the defense is non-infringement-not
invalidity-the alleged infringer may have already attempted to invent
around the patent, precipitating the infringement suit. Thus, inventing
around the patent sometimes will not occur regardless of the particular
form of the settlement.
But in at least some circumstances, a licensing agreement reached
through settlement makes the alleged infringer the patentee's comonopolist, whereas a cash payment by the patentee simply puts the
alleged infringer on the path to creating a new non-infringing device or
process. A rule prohibiting all cash payments by the patentee to the alleged
infringer to discontinue the allegedly infringing use forces settlements in
the direction of licensing agreements which may impose greater social
costs than the cash payment.92
2. The Misconception About Directional Flow
To many observers, exit payments in settlement of patent infringement
lawsuits appear to flow in the wrong direction, thus evidencing a nefarious
purpose on the part of the litigants.93 In an ordinary case of patent
91. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93, 107 (1994). A first-mover advantage may exist in markets characterized by
demand-side network effects-that is, where the utility a consumer derives from consuming the
good increases with the number of other users. Id. A patentee in a market dominated by demandside network effects-for example, operating systems software - may gain a strong advantage over
later entrants to the market. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of FairUse in Patent
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2000).
92. In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000), the
Cardizem court rejected the argument that the patentee's $10 million quarterly payment to the
alleged infringer would provide the infringer with capital to invent around the patent. Id. at 705.
In that case, however, the settlement agreement barred the alleged infringer from marketing not
only the directly infringing product, but also anybioequivalent or generic version of the patentee's
drug. Id.
93. See generallyMcDonald, supranote 11.
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infringement, the patentee/plaintiff would usually collect from the
infringer/defendant-not vice versa. Thus, the patentee's payment to the
alleged infringer looks facially like the sharing of monopoly rents made
possible by the alleged infringer's exit from the market.
In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,94 the district court found a
patent settlement agreement between a brand-name pharmaceutical
manufacturer and a generic manufacturer to be unlawful.95 The generic
manufacturer accepted quarterly payments of $10 million to not market its
allegedly infringing generic during the pendency of the infringement
litigation.96 The Cardizem district court found the brand-name firm's
payments to the generic manufacturer, to keep the generic off the market,
to be a naked market allocation agreement that was per se illegal under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 7 The court cited a law review article to
support its holding:
[W]ere one competitor to agree to pay, and to pay, another to
leave a business in order to eliminate its competition, all
would accept that ordinarily there had been a per se antitrust
violation. A similar anti-competitive result can be achieved,
in a more innocent-appearing manner, if the patent owner
pays money, or gives an infringer some thing of value, to be
subject to a patent injunction, especially if the injunction is
broader than the claims. Ordinarily, consideration flows the
other way; the infringer pays some amount to the patent
owner for past infringement and then agrees to be subject to
an injunction for the remaining life ofthe patent, or is granted
a license ....
If the patent owner pays the infringer, and if the
infringer settles by accepting an injunction, or agrees to
abandon the field, scrutiny is warranted.98
The Cardizem court thus placed emphasis on the "directional flow" of the
payments, finding a "reverse payment" from the patentee to the alleged
infringer to be inherently suspicious.99 Other courts, and the FTC, have
similarly found suspicious settlement payments flowing from the patentee
to the alleged infringer. In another Cardizem case, the D.C. Circuit found
that "payment flowing from the innovator to the challenging generic firm
may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties in entering

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
Id. at 704.
Id.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 704 n.14 (citing Hoerner, supra note 12, at 122, 123).
Id.
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the agreement and the rent-preserving effect of that agreement."' 00 In its
complaint in the In re Abbott Laboratoriescase, the FTC focused on the
directional flow of the $4.5 million monthly payments from the patentee
to the alleged infringer, alleging that the "purpose and effect" of the
payment was to prevent the generic's entry into the market.01
Commissioner Thomas B. Leary of the FTC has echoed similar concerns
about "reverse payments," asserting that "[p]ayments in settlement would
normally10 2be expected to flow from the alleged infringer to the patent
holder."
The statement that a payment from the patentee to the alleged infringer
is designed to keep the alleged infringer off of the market is obviously true,
but not necessarily determinative of whether prohibiting the practice is
socially optimal. In the immediate sense, it is true that consumers would
be better off with a competing generic version of the drugs at issue in
Cardizemand In Re Abbott Laboratories,but merely focusing on the social
benefits of competition after the creation of the patented item ignores the
very foundation of the patent system-the expected monopoly rents that
provide the ex ante incentives to engage in inventive activity.0 3 In either
case, it might have been socially desirable for the generic not to enter the
market if it in fact infringed on the brand-name firm's patent.
Further, the expectation that proper settlement payments should flow
as damages payments from the infringer to the patentee-and not as exit
or non-entry payments from the patentee to the infringer-is a false
generalization. The directional flow of settlement payments in patent
infringement suits is affected by many factors other than the merits of the
patentee's infringement claim.
Many times every year, patent infringement defendants settle
infringement lawsuits by paying the patentee a sum of money as damages
in exchange for the patentee's dismissal of its infringement lawsuit.0 4

100. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
Balto, supra note 12, at 335).
101. In re Abbott Labs. & Geneva Pharms., No. C-3945, 2000 FTC LEXIS 65, * 14 (FTC May
22, 2000).
102. Leary, supra note 12, at 9 n.28. Leary stops short of advocating a bright line prohibiting
such payments, asserting that "[t]he line between reverse payments and other benefits flowing to
the generic manufacturer, like an earlier license or reduced license fee, is too fuzzy for ironclad

distinctions." Id. at 7.
103. Lawrence A. Sullivan &Ann I. Jones, Monopoly Conduct,EspeciallyLeveragingPower
from One Productor Marketto Another, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 165,
167 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992) (arguing that even though in the "ex post
posture, the more efficient solution would be to insist on prices related to cost," monopoly costs
of intellectual property rights are justified by need for ex ante expectations of monopoly profit
sufficient to stimulate innovation).
104. An average of over 1000 intellectual property lawsuits are filed every year but fewer than
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Usually, these settlements are accompanied by the defendant's agreement
to cease and desist its infringing use, and often include a stipulated
injunction.'0 5 Such settlements have never been thought to raise antitrust
concerns. Since the patentee had the legal right to prohibit the infringing
use, the patentee should be entitled to recover from the defendant the
lawful monopoly rents lost as a result of the defendant's infringement." 6
If the defendant had prevailed at trial, it would have recovered ajudgment
representing lost monopoly rents. 0 7 It therefore may choose to settle its
infringement claim for some smaller recovery of its lost monopoly rents
than it otherwise would have been permitted to recover at trial.
Why would the patentee choose to settle for some smaller amount than
it might otherwise recover at trial? Certainly, litigation expenses, the timevalue of money, and the distraction of litigation encourage pre-trial
settlements.' 8 But those factors may not be strong if the patentee expects
to recover its attorneys fees and pre-judgment interest from the infringer.0 9
A more significant incentive to settle is the uncertainty about the outcome
of the litigation-the probability that the defendant will be found not to
have infringed the patent or that the patent will be found invalid. The
patentee can hedge against this risk by settling the lawsuit for some amount
less than the amount it would be permitted to recover at trial.
'When an infringement plaintiff accepts a discount on the value of its
lost-monopoly rent damages claim in exchange for the certainty of
recovering some portion of its damages plus the certainty that the allegedly
infringing use will cease, it has effectively bought out the possibility of
competition that would destroy the value of its patent monopoly. This is no
different than if the patentee paid a potential new entrant-and potential
infringer-not to enter the market and begin the allegedly infringing
conduct.
100 ever reach trial. Miele, supra note 44, at 68 (citing Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Annual Reports of the Director).
105. Indeed, where the expected future useful life of the patent substantially exceeds the
period of past alleged infringement, the agreement to cease and desist or the injunction may be the
biggest prize for the defendant.
106. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171,
1173 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
107. Id. If the infringement is willful, treble damages are awarded. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
108. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 215 (1994).
109. The patentee may be awarded attorney's fees in "exceptional cases," such as cases of
willful infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000). Pre-judgment interest is also recoverable, at the
discretion of the court. See GMC v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983). The fact-finder
determines the appropriate rate of pre-judgment interest. See Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
718 F.2d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Post-judgment interest is set at the statutory treasury bill rate,
28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000), which may be significantly lower than the patentee's cost of capital.
Thus, a patentee should not expect that the possibility of fee and cost-shifting will make it
completely whole for its expended attorneys fees and the time-value of its lost earnings.
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Consider the following example. Firm A holds a patent that is the
essential ingredient in a widget. Because of its patent, Firm A commands
a monopoly in the market for widgets. Firm B begins marketing a widget,
which Firm A alleges infiinges its patent. The price of the widget falls, and
volume increases. Though output has increased, Firm A loses sales to Firm
B. Thus, as a result of Firm B's entry, Firm A now sells fewer units at a
lower price. Firm A's net losses in earnings compared to the earnings
before B's entry-assumed to be $1000-represent the monopoly rents
attributable to the patent. A year after Firm B's entry, Firm A sues for
patent infringement, seeking both damages for the period of infringement
and an injunction against future infringement. Firm B responds that the
patent is invalid, or in the alternative, that its use is non-infringing.
Two years into the litigation-three years after the alleged infringement
began-Firms A and B discuss settlement. Firm A claims damages of
$3000 to date. The net present value of Firm A's monopoly rents (absent
infringement) over the remaining life of the patent is $10,000. Thus, a
judgment awarding FirmA $3000 in compensatory damages and enjoining
Firm B's continued manufacture of widgets would have a value to Firm A
of $13,000. On the other hand, Firm B faces a potential liability of $3000
and also the loss of a future income stream for the remaining life of the
patent, with a net present value of $4000. Thus, a judgment for Firm A
would cost Firm B $7000, while it would constitute a $13,000 benefit for
FirmA.
Assuming that the parties are rational," ° risk-averse, and agree on the
relative probabilities oftheir winning or losing, they will probably settle."'
But who pays whom depends on the likelihood that Firm A's lawsuit will
be successful.
Assume that Firm A's probability ofwinning at trial is 75%. At the time
of the settlement discussions, Firm A's expected value from the lawsuit is
$9,750. Firm B's expected loss from the lawsuit is $5,250. Firm A will
therefore be willing to settle the lawsuit for any agreement that would
bring it $9,750 or more in value, whereas Firm B will be willing to settle
the lawsuit for any agreement that will cost it $5,250 or less. Since an
110. Settlement models based on an assumption that litigants will rationally seek to maximize
their economic well-being have been questioned. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV.
77, 79 (1997) (arguing that litigants-as opposed to their lawyers-are more likely to pursue
litigation for reasons not accounted for by standard economic models of settlement).
I ll. Rational parties will settle a lawsuit when both parties agree that a settlement will
increase their welfare more than a trial. POSNER, supra note 66, at 608. Generally this will occur
when the difference between their joint costs of pursuing the litigation through trial exceed their
expected risk-adjusted litigation outcomes, even if the parties are risk-neutral. George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1984). See
generally POSNER, supra note 66, at 607-15.
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injunction brings Firm A $10,000 in future value, Firm A would be willing
to pay Firm B up to $250 to agree, through a stipulated injunction, to
discontinue manufacturing widgets. If Firm B agrees to the injunction, it
will incur $4000 in costs due to its loss of the future revenue stream from
selling widgets. In addition to consenting to the injunction, Firm B would
be willing to pay Firm A up to $1,250 to settle. Thus, the settlement will
consist of a stipulated injunction and a transfer of money ranging from a
payment by A to B of $250 to a payment by B to A of $1,250.
Changes in the probability of success ofA's lawsuit affect the direction
that the payment will flow. If the likelihood of Firm A's success is 90%,
the payment will certainly be from Firm B to Firm A." 2 If the likelihood
of success is 50%, it will certainly be from Firm A to Firm B." 3 The
"directional flow" of the settlement payment, therefore, will be affected by
the probability of the plaintiff's lawsuit succeeding.
Other factors also affect the directional flow o.fthe settlement payment.
For example, the ratio of the damages from past infringement to the
patentee's value from receiving the injunction will be significant. If the
patentee sues to enjoin a new entrant before its product reaches the market,
the settlement payment necessarily must be from the patentee to the new
entrant, since the patentee would not have any damages to claim.
Conversely, if the patent has already been infringed for a number of years
and damages have accrued, or even if the period of past infringement is
relatively short but the value of the patent will soon expire due to
technological changes, new inventions, consumer demand, or other factors,
the settlement payment is more likely to be made from the defendant to the
plaintiff. Thus, the directional flow of the payment may be significantly
influenced by the timeline of past and expected future events. The longer
the period of past infringement and the greater the associated quantum of
past damages compared to the expected future useful life of the patent and
its expected future income stream, the more likely it is that the payment
will flow from the defendant to the plaintiff-and vice versa.
Further, where the possible settlement range includes the possibility
that payment could flow in either direction (as in the hypothetical above),
the direction the payment ultimately flows depends on the parties'
bargaining power in the settlement negotiations. Contributing factors might

112. Firm A's expected value from the litigation is $11,700, so, in addition to the injunction,
it will require Firm B to pay at least $1,700 in damages. Firm B's expected loss from the litigation
is $6,300. Thus, after agreeing to the injunction, it will pay up to $2,300 in damages.
113. Firm A's expected value from the litigation is $6,500, so, in addition to the injunction,
it will pay Firm B up to $3,500 to stop making widgets, which will secure it the $10,000 in future
monopoly profits. Firm B's expected loss from the litigation is $3,500. If it agrees to the injunction,
it will incur a loss of $4000 in future earnings, so it will insist on a payment of at least $500 to
settle.
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include the parties' business relationship, their financial strength, their
appetite for risk, shareholders' confidence in management, and many other
business factors with little or no bearing on the competitive effect of the
settlement agreement.
Somewhat surprisingly, even if payment flows from the alleged
infringer to the patentee as damages, the settlement may be unjustifiable
under the antitrust laws. Assume that Firm A owns the patent on a widget
with a useful life of five years and associated monopoly rents of $300 per
year. Firm B enters the market with an allegedly infringing knock-off in
the first year that Firm A markets the widget. Firm A is unable to obtain a
preliminary injunction against Firm B's marketing of the knock-off. Patent
litigation ensues until the fourth year, by which time Firm A has lost $1600
in profits." 4 Firm A has expectation damages of $400 in the fifth year of
the patent's useful life.
Assuming that the probability that Firm A will establish at trial that
Firm B is liable for patent infringement is only 30%/--Firm A's
infringement claims have relatively little merit-Firm A's expected value
from the lawsuit is $600."' Firm B's expected cost from the lawsuit is
$510.' 6Given these figures, Firm A will not agree to a settlement in which
Firm B merely exits the market for year five-that would only be worth
$400 to A. The case should settle for a payment from B to A in the range
of $110 to $200 and B's promise to exit the market."'
Under this scenario, the settlement will impose a deadweight loss to
society in year five as Firm A exacts monopoly rents from sales of the
widget, even though the probability that Firm A's patent is good-the
probability that Firm A's monopoly is a legally sanctioned one-is slim.
Although the patent infringement claim was relatively unmeritorious,
payment flowed from the defendant to the plaintiff in "the usual way"
merely because of the ratio between the lengthy period of past damages
and the relatively short period of future useful life ofthe patent-a fact that
should have no relevance in determining whether permitting the settlement
was socially optimal. If this settlement is permitted, society will bear
deadweight losses in year five based on the stipulated confirmation of a
very shaky claim of legal entitlement to a monopoly.

114. Firm A's losses are comprised of $1200 in monopoly rents and $400 in lost sales at the
assumed competitive price. Firm B's entry causes the price of widgets to drop (thus costing A
profits per unit sale) and takes away some of Firm A's market share (assumed to cost Firm A
$100/year) even though the market as a whole expands due to the charging of a lower price.
115. 0.3 x ($1600 (past damages) + $400 (year five profits A will earn if B exits the market)).
116. 0.3 x ($1600 (past damages) + $100 (Firm B's lost profits in year five if it exits the
market)).
117. Since Firm A gains $400 as a result of Firm B's promise to exit, that amount will be

factored into the settlement.
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Thus, the "directional flow" of the settlement payment does not,
standing alone, provide a basis for evaluating the potential anticompetitive
effects of a settlement agreement.' Even settlements in which a patentee
agrees to receive from the defendant an amount of compensation less than
it otherwise would be entitled to recover together with an injunction
against future infringement represent a sharing of monopoly rents with the
defendant. These are equivalent to agreements providing that the patentee
will pay the defendant x to agree to the injunction and the defendant will
pay the patentee 2x in damages.
Therefore, the directional flow of the payment is influenced by factors
that have no bearing on the competitive impact of the settlement such as
the ratio of past infringement to future income stream and the bargaining
power of the litigants, and by factors that may have some such bearing,
such as the probability that the patentee will prevail on the merits. In
evaluating patent infringement settlements, the enforcement agencies and
the courts should look deeper than the mere direction in which cash (or inkind) payments flow.
III. RECONCILING THE COMPETING POLICIES
The preceding part has shown that both rules prohibiting and permitting
exit payment settlements may impose a variety of social costs and that
"directional flow" of a settlement payment is not, by itself, a rational
policy for determining the antitrust effects of settlements. The optimal
legal position regarding such settlements requires taking into account all
of the relevant costs and formulating a rule that harmonizes the competing
strands of public policy. Unfortunately, the prevailing approach toward
patent settlements has glossed over the cost/benefit nuances and required
courts to engage in a virtually meaningless inquiry into the parties'
subjective intent in settling.
A. The Prevailing "Good Faith" Approach
The prevailing approach to determining the legality of patent
settlements is to inquire whether the settlement was entered into in "good
faith" or instead represents a "bad faith" conspiracy to divide markets. This
approach, which requires analyzing the subjective intentions of the parties
to determine their motivation in settling, is fundamentally flawed.
118. The same is true of a settlement in which no payment flows--the patentee forgoes its
claim to damages for past infringement and the alleged infringer agrees to exit the market. E.g.,
Dole Refrigerating Co. v. Kold-Hold Mfg. Co., 185 F.2d 809, 812 (6th Cir. 1950). Although no
money changes hand, the patentee is effectively buying out the probability that it will fail in its
infringement claim with the probability that the alleged infringer will have to make a damages
payment.
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In Singer,"9 the leading case enunciating the good faith standard, the
holder of patents and patent applications concerning machine-carried
multicam zigzag sewing machines, entered into a series of cross-licensing
agreements with two European patentees to settle various pending or
threatened infringement actions. 20 In the settlement agreements, the parties
stipulated, among other things, that they would not bring infringement
12
actions against each other or oppose each other's patent applications. 1
The district court found that "[the] dominant and sole purpose of the
license agreement was to settle the conflict in priority" between the parties,
and thus found no antitrust violation in the settlements.' The Supreme
Court reversed, concluding, based on the district court's finding of facts
that the purpose of the settlement was to exclude Japanese manufacturers
from the United States market, and, thus, that the government had
established an antitrust violation."
The Supreme Court relied heavily on evidence ofthe parties' intentions
in settling. 24 Defendants, the Court claimed, had engaged in the
transactions "for an illegal purpose," that is, to rid themselves "of
infringements by their common competitors, the Japanese
manufacturers."' 25 Thus, much of the Singer opinion focuses on the course
of dealing between the parties, including specific statements made in
26
correspondence and other communications between the settling parties.1
Courts following Singer have searched for evidence of "good faith" or
"bad faith" by the settling parties. In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milken,
Inc. ,127 the Fourth Circuit refused to pierce the attorney-client privilege and
allow discovery of documents concerning a previous settlement of patent
infringement litigation wherein the warring parties had agreed to forego
their mutual claims for patent infringement. 2 Plaintiffs alleged that the
settlement agreement had in fact been a covert conspiracy to preserve the
defendants' respective monopolies and to foreclose competition from other
manufacturers.' The court found that plaintiffs had not made a sufficient

119.
120.
121.
122.

See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 177 (1963).
Id.at 177-78, 187.
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 205 F. Supp. 394, 413 (1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 174

(1963).
123. Singer, 374 U.S. at 190.
124. Id.at 189-90.
125. Id. at 189.
126. Id.at 191. For example, the Court quoted from record evidence showing that the settling
parties had discussed "doing something 'against Japanese competition '" and pooling their resources

for "mutual enforcement" efforts. Id.
127. 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976).
128. Id. at 1223.
129. Id.at 1218.
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threshold showing of illicit intent on the part of the defendants, and
therefore had not shown a crime or fraud sufficient to permit piercing the
attorney-client privilege. 3 '
It is well established that "where there are legitimately
conflicting [patent] claims or threatened interferences, a
settlement by agreement, rather than by litigation, is not
precluded by the [Sherman] Act." . . . It is only when
settlement agreements are entered into in bad faith and are
utilized as part of a scheme to restrain or monopolize trade
that antitrust violations may occur.'
Singer and Duplan thus hold that "bad faith"-the settling parties'
subjective intention to restrain competition or further monopoly power-is
the touchstone of illegitimacy in patent litigation settlements. 3 2 The role
of a court in evaluating a patent infringement settlement is to sift through
the parties' course of dealing for evidence of nefarious intent.' A
settlement is permitted if it represents the honest compromise of a bona
fide dispute and condemned if it is instead found to be part of a
monopolistic scheme.'34
This approach has serious limitations. The parties' subjective intent has
never been a particularly good yardstick forjudging the competitive effects
of either joint or unilateral conduct. 3 It is a particularly poor yardstick for
determining whether a settlement agreement terminating patent litigation
should be challenged on antitrust grounds.' 3 6 A patentee's intentions are
virtually always explicitly "anticompetitive" in the precise sense in which
antitrust lawyers mean those words-the patentee wishes to suppress the
competition for its patented good in order to preserve a stream of
monopoly rents from that good. Two firms may reach a settlement
agreement in patent cross-litigation-where each firm's patents are alleged
to be invalid-precisely because they do not want to risk losing the rents

130. Id. at 1220. The attorney-client privilege maybe pierced where the attorneys themselves
were involved in the perpetration of a crime or a fraud. E.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554
(1989).
13 1. Duplan, 540 F.2d at 1220 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931);
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963)) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
132. See Singer,374 U.S. at 194-95; Duplan, 540 F.2d at 1220-21.
133. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
134. See Duplan, 540 F.2d at 1220.
135. The utility of subjective intent as a measuring stick in antitrust cases has been sharply
questioned. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 214 (2d ed. 2001) ("Any doctrine that
relies upon proof of intent is going to be applied erratically at best."); Ronald A. Cass & Keith N.
Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 676 (2001) (criticizing use of subjective intent in
antitrust cases).
136. See Cass & Hylton, supra note 135, at 676.
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associated with their patents. "[R]estrain[ing] or monopoliz[ing] trade" is
precisely what patentees lawfully do.' 37
The fact that firms would wish to settle for purposes of maintaining
monopoly rents tells us little about the net social costs or benefits of such
settlements, as discussed in the preceding part. The Singer settlement may
have been socially optimal despite the parties' stated intention of
suppressing Japanese competition if the competition in fact infringed the
parties' patents. Conversely, the Duplan settlement may have been
unjustifiable on antitrust grounds if the competing patent claims were
weak, even if twenty bishops would have sworn that the parties settled
with the purest of motives. The desire to obtain or maintain monopoly
rents is the same desire that motivates firms to invest capital in potentially
patentable innovation in the first instance. Patents are legally sanctioned
monopolies and the desire to protect the income stream attributable to
those monopolies cannot neatly be characterized as "good faith" or "bad
faith."
B. A Better Approach-Ex Ante Determinationof Merits
A more sophisticated policy toward patent settlements than the good
faith/bad faith standard is required. The appropriate rule must recognize
that both permitting and prohibiting exit payments takes into account all
of the relevant costs, potentially imposing social costs and seeking to
achieve the lowest net cost.
The proposed balancing act requires some effort to quantify the relevant
costs. But to complicate matters, the deadweight losses attributable to
settlements and the direct costs of litigation (attorneys fees, drain on
corporate resources, and judicial resources) are much more easily
quantified than the indirect costs of litigation (freeriding on confidential
information and trade secrets, implicit collusion due to sharing of
information through discovery) and the innovation costs oftaking away the
right to settle. Courts and antitrust enforcers easily see the costs of
permitting the settlement of unmeritorious patent infringement
claims-deadweight losses in the form of monopoly pricing that could be
avoided if litigation were required and the patentee's monopolistic claims
rejected. As lawyers, they also understand from experience the direct costs
of protracted litigation. 3 ' But the other costs discussed in this Article are
137. Singer, 374 U.S. at 405, 430.
138. The law of litigation is influenced by the biases, whether intentional or not, of lawyers,
judges, and government policy-makers (lawyers) who make the rules. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The
PriceofLaw: How the Marketfor Lawyers Distortsthe Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953,99293 (2000). The law of settlements is no exception. Systemic biases may include under-counting the
cost of litigation by focusing solely on the fees generated by lawyers, instead of other indirect costs
of litigation. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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less obvious in most instances, and putting a price tag on them may be
impossible.
Rather than attempting the likely impossible-and excessively
costly-task of calculating the respective costs in every instance, courts
and antitrust enforcers would do well to adopt presumptions about the
relative costs of exit payment settlements based on the probability of the
patentee's success on the merits. The higher the likelihood that the
patentee's infringement claim is valid, the more likely it is that the costs
of a rule prohibiting exit settlement payments outweigh the costs of
permitting the exit payment, and vice versa. Thus, making some ex ante
judgment about the merits of the infringement lawsuit is necessary to
determine whether the exit payment should be permitted or prohibited.
This is so because most of the costs identified in this Article caused by
different patent infringement settlement rules vary at least to some extent
with the probability of the patentee's success in its infringement suit. First,
the cost of permitting exit payments is the likelihood that the patentee will
fail to prove its infringement case multiplied by the deadweight loss caused
by the patentee's monopolistic pricing.'39 This cost varies solely with the
likelihood of success on the merits.
Similarly, the innovation costs of rules prohibiting exit payments are
highly correlated with the ex ante probability that the inventor will succeed
in prosecuting a patent infringement lawsuit. Since innovation costs follow
risk aversion, they will be the most concentrated in instances when the
inventor has a high ex ante expectation of being able to defend its
monopoly rights. The firm that would invest capital in a patentable
invention knowing that it has only a 50% chance of reaping monopoly
rewards from its investment shows a higher appetite for risk than the firm
that invests believing that it has a 90% chance of reaping monopoly
rewards. The loss of the settlement right-a form of insurance against the
loss of the monopoly right-is more likely to lead to diminution in
investment by the risk-averse
firm with a 90% chance than the risk-neutral
14
firm with a 50% chance. 1
Litigation costs move with factors other than the parties' respective
likelihood of success on the merits, such as the complexity of the case and
the competence of the court overseeing the litigation, but they also may
move with the patentee's likelihood of success. In general, litigants are
willing to spend an amount up to their expected gains or losses in the

139. For example, if the patentee would impose $100 in deadweight losses if the alleged
infringer exited the market and the patentee's prospect of winning the patent infringement lawsuit
was 50%, the cost of permitting an exit payment would be $50.
140. Insurance generally is purchased by individuals orfirms with a low tolerance for risk. See
POSNER, supra note 66, at 116 (generally discussing the economics of deciding to purchase
insurance).
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lawsuit to advance their position.' 4 ' Where the litigation involves crossclaims for infringement by two patentees, the pool ofmonopoly profits will
be unaffected by which party wins, and each party will be willing to spend
in litigation an amount up to its expected gains from obtaining the
monopoly right.'42 A change in the probability of success merely shifts the
expenditures from one party to the other, but the total expenditures remain
constant. However, in the more common case of unilateral claims of
infringement, the risks and rewards of litigation are asymmetrical.' 43 The
monopolist stands to gain more from prevailing than the alleged infringer
does, since the patentee reaps monopoly rewards-increased market share
and higher price-if it prevails, whereas the alleged infringer only earns
a share of the market at the competitive price if it prevails.'" Thus, the
higher the likelihood that the patentee will prevail on its infringement
claim, the greater the total costs that will be spent on the lawsuit.'45
The "discovery costs" of litigation are not as obviously correlated with
an increase in the probability that the patentee will prevail in its
infringement claim. In general, both freeriding on trade secrets through
information exchange in discovery and implicit collusion facilitated by that
141. This is not to say that litigants will automatically spend up to their expected gains or
losses in the litigation, since there may be a diminishing marginal return to litigation expenditures
and an incremental dollar expended on the litigation may not purchase an incremental dollar of
probability of success on the merits. See POSNER, supra note 135, at 15.
142. Cross-litigation ofthis kind is a form of competition for monopoly profits that eats up the
gains of monopoly pricing. See POSNER, supra note 135, at 13-18, 66 (discussing competition for
monopoly profits); see also supra note 114.
143. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, PyschologicalBarriersto LitigationSettlement:
An ExperimentalApproach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107, 114 (1994).
144. For example, assume that the patentee's gain from winning the infringement lawsuit
would be $1000 and that the alleged infringer's gain from winning would be $200. At a 60%
chance that the patentee would prevail on its infringement claim, the patentee would be willing to
spend up to $600 in litigation costs and the alleged infringer would be willing to spend $80, thus
a maximum total of $680 in litigation costs would be incurred. At an 80% chance of success by the
patentee, the patentee would be willing to spend up to $800 in litigation costs, whereas the alleged
infringer would spend $40, for a total of $840.
145. One complication in this analysis is that the level of expenditure on legal fees may affect
the probability of success in the lawsuit. Under a single-player model, a rational firm would expend
an incremental dollar on legal fees only if it expected that expenditure to increase, by at least a
dollar, the value of its claims in the lawsuit. But the dynamics of litigation, which inherently
involves two players, suggests that there is not a direct correlation between one firm's increases in
expenditure and the likely outcome of the lawsuit. The first firm's level of resource commitment
to the lawsuit may also affect its opponent's level of resource commitment, given the fact that the
opponent may be forced to spend similar resources to "stay in the game." Particular types of
litigation initiatives, for example noticing numerous depositions or heavy motion practice, may
require a similar level of resource commitment by the adversary. Although the reacting party may
attempt to litigate more cheaply (i.e., hire a less expensive law firm, prepare less for the deposition,
or research less for the motions), the investment of litigation resources by one firm may not
substantially affect the likely outcome of the infringement lawsuit if its adversary responds in kind.
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information exchange provide motivation, extrinsic to the likely outcome
of the lawsuit, for firms with ulterior motives to continue to participate in
the lawsuit.'46
In general, however, the costs of prohibiting exit payments increase as
the probability of the patentee's success increases, and the costs of
permitting exit payments generally decrease as the probability of the
patentee's success decreases. At high levels ofprobability that the patentee
will prevail in the lawsuit, the costs of prohibiting exit payments outweigh
the costs of permitting them, and vice versa. Exit payments should
therefore be permitted when the probability that the patentee will succeed
is high, and be147disallowed when the probability that the patentee will
succeed is low.
The difficulty is in formulating a way of determining the expected
outcome of the lawsuit without requiring a full-blown inquiry into the
merits, which would effectively mean the adoption of a no-exit-payment
rule. If the only way for the settling parties to prove that an exit payment
was justified because the patentee's likelihood of success was high were
fully to prove the patentee's case, then patent settlements would require the
equivalent of full discovery, a trial, and all of the costs litigation imposes.
Exit payments should be permitted in situations of relatively high ex ante
likelihood of success by the patentee, without requiring the patentee
actually to prove its infringement claim. In order to achieve this outcome,
this Article proposes four flexible approaches to aid in determining the
legality of exit payments. 4 '

146. The exception may arise in a case where the patentee's success on the merits would cause
the alleged infringer to exit the market altogether and no longer be the patentee's competitor. Under
those circumstances, the higher the likelihood that the patentee will prevail on the merits, the lower
the costs of freeriding and implicit collusion. Since freeriding of the type described in this Article
and implicit collusion through information exchange would typically only occur between
competitors, the lower the likelihood that the two firms will continue to be competitors, the lower
these costs will be as a result of protracted litigation with substantial information exchange. Thus,
under some circumstances, "discovery costs" may be an exception to the general rule that the costs
of prohibiting "exit payments" increase with the likelihood that the patentee will succeed on the
merits, and indeed the converse may be true.
147. In CharlesPfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574, 577-79, 582-83, 586 (6th Cir. 1968), the
Sixth Circuit found a cross-licensing agreement between two pharmaceutical companies that
resulted in a cooperative effort to withhold material information from the patent examiner to be
illegal under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, even though the court assumed the
patent to be valid. Id.
148. These proposed rules do not claim perfection of outcome, but merely improvement over
the status quo and relative workability. To borrow from Richard Epstein, I would consider them
a success if they attained the optimal result in 90-95% of cases to which they were applied. See
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 53 (1995).
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1. Payments by Patentee to Alleged Infringer After Grant of
Preliminary Injunction (Without Collusion) Are
Presumptively Lawful
It is ordinary practice in patent infringement litigation for the patentee
to seek a preliminary injunction against the patentee's alleged infringing
use during the pendency of the litigation.'49 The criteria for the granting of
a preliminary injunction require the court to consider whether the patentee
has shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.150 Thus, at an
early stage in the litigation, the trial court often has occasion to make a
preliminary determination regarding the merits of the infringement claim.
The preliminary injunction mechanism provides a useful bright line for
evaluating the competitive significance of some settlements. For antitrust
purposes, if the district court grants a preliminary injunction in favor of the
patentee, that ruling should be considered conclusive evidence that the
public interest in requiring a trial is insufficient to outweigh the costs of
prohibiting the patentee to pay the alleged infringer to quit its infringing
use and exit the market.'
Courts and the regulatory agencies have already shown some
propensity to consider a preliminary injunction as relevant in determining
the competitive effects of an exit payment. The Cardizem court placed
considerable weight on the fact that, prior to-the condemned settlement,
there had been no "judicial finding that [the patentee] was likely to succeed
on the merits of its infringement suit."'52 The FTC similarly placed weight
on the absence of a preliminary injunction finding in In Re Abbott
53
Laboratories.'
Antitrust decisions have not uniformly looked to ex ante predictions
about patent settlement outcomes as probative of the antitrust
permissibility of the settlement. In a recent exit payment decision
involving extended release microencapsulated potassium chloride, a

149. See Michael E. Melton, "The Real Ordinance" (TRO) for Patent Enforcement, 619
PLI/Pat 371, 377 (2000) (stating that seeking preliminary injunctive relief is normally considered
in patent litigation and that the likelihood of securing such relief has grown since the creation of
the Federal Circuit in 1983).
150. E.g., Amazon.Com, Inc. v. BarnesandNoble.Com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
151. The converse is not necessarily true. A showing of both likelihood of success on the
merits and irreparable harm absent the injunction is required for the granting of a preliminary
injunction. Id. Thus, while the granting of a preliminary injunction necessarily requires a finding
of substantial merit to the patentee's claims, the denial of a preliminary injunction does not
necessarily reflect at all on the patentee's claims.
152. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 704 n.14 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
153. In reAbbott Labs. & Geneva Pharms., No. C-3945, 2000 FTC LEXIS 65, *29 (FTC May
22, 2000) ("Moreover, the restraints contained in the agreement were entered into without any
judicial finding that Abbott was likely to succeed on the merits of its infringement suit....").
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Federal Trade Commission Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)relied on trial
evidence that "the likely outcome of the patent disputes cannot reliably be
predicted" in finding that the FTC's Complaint Counsel had failed to prove
that the relevant settlement agreements had delayed competition.' 54 This
assertion was not factually disputed on the record. The patentee's expert
testified that "there is no recognized methodology for handicapping trials
or for testing the reliability of predictions of litigation outcomes,"' 155 and
the Government conceded that "the outcome of the patent litigation cannot
be predicted."' 56
But while it may be true that "[i]ntellectual property litigation is more
uncertain than other types of litigation,"' 57 the predictive value of the
"likelihood of success on the merits" factor in the preliminary injunction
standard may be no weaker in forecasting the ultimate result of the case
than a trial on the merits. In Schering-Plough,the ALJ cited trial testimony
that the Federal Circuit has a 50% reversal rate as evidence that it is
extremely difficult to predict the outcome of patent lawsuits.'58 Even
assuming that this statistic accurately reflects the probability of reversal of
a district court's determination in a patent infringement lawsuit,'59 it does
not differentiate between reversals following a preliminary injunction and
reversals following a full trial on the merits. If radical uncertainty about
ultimate outcomes in patent litigation persists even after a full trial on the
merits, then even a post-trial settlement after an adjudication of
infringement could be questioned on the ground that the adjudication sans
appeal was insufficiently final a determination ofthe patent claim to permit
the "market division" exit payment.
Further, there is some statistical evidence that the Federal Circuit has
a bias in favor of findings of patent validity and patent infringement.160 If
this is so, it suggests that a pro-patentee district court determination on a
preliminary injunction is relatively unlikely to be disturbed on appeal.
Stated otherwise, the social expectation in avoiding deadweight losses
attributable to monopoly reductions in output following an exit payment

154. In re Schering-Plough Corp. v. Upsher-Smith Labs., No. 9297 (FTC June 27, 2002), at
104, availableat www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/scheringinitialdecision.
155. Id.at 74-75.
156. Id. at 75.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. The most recent available statistics published by the Federal Circuit indicate that, for the
twelve month period ending September 30, 2000, the percentage of reversals from District
Courts-which would typically hear patent disputes-was 16%. Reports of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Table B-8, availableat www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep00.
160. Donald R. Duner et al.,A StatisticalLookat the FederalCircuit'sPatentDecisions 19821994, 5 FED. CIR.B.J. 151 (1995).
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patent settlement is particularly low when the exit payment follows a
preliminary injunction upholding the patentee's infringement claim.
In any event, ex ante predictions about litigation outcomes in patent
lawsuits are a well-established feature of patent litigation and codified in
the preliminary injunction standard. Permitting exit payments following
the grant of a preliminary injunction has the virtue of establishing a brightline antitrust safe-harbor, thus eliminating the uncertainty that patentees
and alleged infringers face in attempting to construct settlement
agreements.
There is, however, one important caveat. In order to claim the benefit
of this proposed settlement safeharbor, the preliminary injunction must
have been genuinely contested. If the parties stipulate to an injunction in
order to end the litigation, the resulting injunction should have no
significance for the antitrust issues. Similarly, evidence that the parties
reached an agreement before the submission of the materials on the motion
for a preliminary injunction or that the defendant failed seriously to contest
the preliminary injunction should eliminate the fact of the injunction as an
independently significant element in evaluating the competitive impact of
the settlement.'61
2. In the Absence of a Preliminary Injunction, Court or Agency
Should Take a "Quick Look" at the Merits
Where a preliminary injunction motion has not been litigated, courts or
agencies evaluating the competitive impact of an exit payment settlement
should make an abbreviated examination of the merits. A "quick look"
approach is familiar under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,'6 2 and a similar
approach could be adopted to evaluate patent infringement settlements. For
example, the court could require the parties to submit affidavits and hold
a hearing similar to a preliminary injunction hearing. If, based on a "quick
look," the court concluded that the patent infringement claim was likely to
succeed, the exit payment settlement should be approved without further
inquiry. Conversely, if the quick look raised significant doubts regarding
the validity of the patent, the exit payment would not be permitted-at
least not without a more thorough adjudication of the patent's validity.

161. On the other hand, the defendant's unintentional incompetence in resisting the
preliminary injunction should not be a reason to deny the settlement antitrust safeharbor status. If
the defendant has litigated incompetently at the preliminary injunction stage, there is no reason to
believe that it will ably vindicate the public interest in challenging the validity of the patentee's
monopoly at the trial stage.
162. E.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447 (1986); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 3
FLORIDA L4WREVIEW

[Vol. 54

A difficulty in the quick look approach could arise due to the lack of
institutional competence by courts or the antitrust enforcement agencies to
evaluate the merits of an infringement claim. As evidenced by the
existence of a specialized court of appeals to handle patent litigation,'63
most judges lack sufficient depth in the complex world of patents to make
snap judgments about questions of validity or infringement. Similarly,
antitrust enforcers typically would not be expected to have the necessary
expertise." Quick look approaches work best when the entity taking the
quick look has significant familiarity with the subject matter it is reviewing
and can
make reasonably informed judgments without a full adversarial
65
trial.
A solution to this institutional competence problem may be to assign
166
the patent issues to a special master for a report and recommendation.
Special masters with expertise on the relevant technical matters are often
used in patent litigation to assist the district court in making its
determination on the merits. 67 For a relatively small investment of time
and money, the court could employ a special master to make a quick
determination regarding the merits of the infringement claim, which could
then serve as a basis for the court's decision about the settlement's likely
competitive effects.

61

163. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has exclusive
jurisdiction over all patent appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
164. See Leary, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that the FTC "is extremely ill equipped to
determine on its own whether patents are valid or not).
165. The Supreme Court's classification of different types of restraints of trade as either per
se illegal or subject to the rule of reason has itself evolved according to the Court's experience with
different types of restraints: "Persetreatment is appropriate 'once experience with a particular kind
of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it."'
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 344 (1982)). The Court has been reluctant to condemn business arrangements as per se
illegal-thus requiring a full-blown exploration of the merits under the rule of reason-when it is
unfamiliar with the relevant practice. Id.
166. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
167. See Margaret G. Farrell, The Role of Special Masters in FederalLitigation, C842 ALIABA 931, 947-51 (1993); see generally MOORE, supra note 58, § 21.52.
168. Since the "quick look" proceedings would be non-adversarial-in the sense that both
parties would have an incentive to admit the alleged infringement-the special master would be
required to perform an inquisitorial, and not merely adjudicative, function. The special master's
posture would be much the same as that of a court conducting a fairness hearing regarding a
proposed class action settlement, where both the attorneys for the plaintiff and the defendant have
an incentive to agree that the settlement was justified because of the merit of the defendant's
position, although third parties (i.e., certain classes of shareholders) might be disadvantaged by the
settlement but lack a sufficient incentive to oppose the settlement. Under such circumstances, the
trial court is supposed to act somewhat as an advocate for the interests that may not be represented
in the courtroom, for example by asking probing questions of the parties. See generallyFED. R. Civ.
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A quick look determination could result in one of several different
outcomes. If the court concluded that the infringement claim was likely to
succeed, the settlement should be approved and that should be the end of
the matter. If the court reached the opposite conclusion, the ramifications
would depend on the posture of the case. If the issue was presented
because the parties sought a stipulated injunction requiring the defendant
to cease and desist the allegedly infringing use, the court would simply
deny the stipulated injunction.69 If the issue was presented because one
party sought to enforce an exit payment settlement agreement after the
fact, the court could similarly deny enforcement of the settlement without
a full examination of the patent's validity.
A preliminary finding of significant doubt regarding the infringement
claim probably could not serve as a basis for a conclusive finding that the
settling parties violated the antitrust laws. If the government brought an
action to invalidate an exit payment agreement or a private party sued for
damages based on such an agreement, a positive quick look (supporting the
patentee's claims) should be sufficient to dismiss the lawsuit, whereas a
negative quick look (calling into question the patentee's claims) would
simply mean a full trial on the merits of the infringement claim. 7 ° For
example, in Dole RefrigeratingCo. v. Kold-HoidManufacturingCo.,17' the
Sixth Circuit found that an infringement settlement in which the alleged
infringer agreed to exit the market was illegal following a full trial on the
merits of the infringement claim. 7
One related matter that may arise is to what extent the parties may be
held liable for treble damages for having entered into, and operated under,
a settlement agreement subsequently found to be a market division
agreement because the patentee's infringement claim lacked merit. To
succeed in such a claim, a plaintiff should be required to show the elements
of a Walker Process' claim for monopolistic abuse of a patent-an
objective lack of merit of the patent infringement claim and a subjective
understanding by the patentee of the wrongfulness of its claim." The
P. 23(e) (requiring consent of district court for dismissal of class action lawsuit); 5 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.85 (2001).
169. At that point, the parties might nonetheless consider dismissing the lawsuit voluntarily,
as they generally have an absolute right to do. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1). Thereafter, the patentee
would have to rely on the defendant's voluntary compliance with the terms of the settlement.
170. It would violate a party's due process rights to be found liable under the Sherman Act
without permitting it a full adjudication on the merits. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
171. 185 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1950).
172. Id. at 816.
173. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
174. A Walker Process claim requires both a showing of subjective disbelief by the patentee
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Walker Processapproach reintroduces an element of "bad faith" into the
analysis of exit payments-a standard enunciated in Duplan and Singer.75
Although a subjective bad faith standard generally has little utility in
determining whether permitting a particular exit payment is socially
optimal, the analysis is different in the context of determining whether
treble damages should be assessed against parties that settled an
infringement lawsuit and then operated for some time under the exit
payment agreement. Under a treble damages analysis, the question is
whether the parties' conduct should be sanctioned based on the ex post
assessment that the infringement claim lacked merit. Since it is generally
agreed that a principal purpose of the treble damages remedy is to deter
intentional anticompetitive conduct,'76 the settling parties' state of mind
should be relevant to .the analysis.
3. Settlement Payments Reflecting Large Proportion of
Patentee's Rents from Patent Disallowed
An alternative to the "quick look" approach that may work better in
some limited circumstances is to place a cap on the percentage of the
patentee's monopoly rents that it may pay the defendant to exit the market.
A settlement in which the patentee is willing to pay the alleged infringer
a large percentage of its monopoly rents from the patent in exchange for
the alleged infringer's promise to discontinue the infringing use reflects a
low probability that the patent is valid or that the defendant's use is
actually infringing. The ratio of the monopoly rents retained by the
patentee to the payments to the exiting defendant is highly indicative of the
merits of the infringement claim. Courts could use that ratio to determine
whether to permit the exit payment settlement agreement, and additionally
extrapolate the probability of the patentee's success on the merits from the
parties' own conduct in settling. Since the parties will settle in a manner
that protects their own economic interests, the parties' implicit statement
regarding the value of the infringement lawsuit may be a more honest
assessment of the relevant probabilities than the quick look approach,

in the claims that it asserted and that the claims were objectively baseless. See Prof I Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (adding objectively baseless
requirement); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that after
ProfessionalReal EstateInvestors, both objective lack of merit and subjective disbelief in litigation
position required to pierce Noerr-Penningionimmunity).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 119-37.
176. See generally Treble Damages Remedy, in ABA Sect. of ANTITRUST MONOGRAPH 13,
30-32 (1986).
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which relies on self-serving statements of the parties with aligned interests
once they have reached an agreement to settle.
Whether this percentage of monopoly rents approach or the quick look
approach works better in a particular case will be largely dependent upon
how easy it is to extrapolate predicted litigation outcomes from the parties'
course of dealing. In many circumstances, that determination may be
extremely difficult or impossible to make, meaning that this test may only
work when the facts are simple. Assume that Firm A has a patent on
widgets. Before Firm B's entry into the market, Firm A sells 1000 widgets
annually at $10/widget at a cost of $5/widget. After Firm B's entry, the
price falls to $8/widget and total market sales increase to 1200 widgets.
Firm A now has a 50% market share, therefore it now sells 600 units
annually, grosses $4800, and nets $1800.177 Its total lost profits as a result
of Firm B's entry are $3200 per year, which are the damages it would
claim in an infringement lawsuit.17 1 On the other hand, Firm B-assuming
that it is an equally efficient producer of widgets-will lose $1800 in
profits if it exits the market.
Assume that one year after Firm B's entry into the market the parties
enter into a settlement agreement whereby Firm B agrees to exit the market
in exchange for a lump sum payment by Firm A of $640. Assume further
that the patent has an expected useful life of five years at a constant rate of
return (and ignore time value issues). Firm A values the lawsuit at $19,200
(six years of $3200 losses), before taking into account the probability of
losing. Firm B values the lawsuit at -$12,200 (one year of $3200 in
damages, five years of $1800 in lost profits if forced to exit), before taking
into account the probability of winning.
Assume now that the parties agree to settle the infringement lawsuit
with Firm B agreeing to discontinue the manufacture of widgets and Firm
A agreeing to make Firm B a one-time payment of $640. From this
payment, it is possible to make a reasonable estimate of the parties' agreed
expectation regarding the outcome of the litigation. Firm A receives
$15,360 in value from the settlement (five future years of $3200 monopoly
rents minus $640), or 80% of its possible gain from the lawsuit. Firm B
incurs a loss of $8360 (five years of $1800 in lost profits plus $640), or
approximately 69% of its total possible loss in the lawsuit. Putting aside
the complications discussed below, we can generally extrapolate that Firm
A considers its likelihood of prevailing in the lawsuit at 80% or less and
Firm B considers its likelihood of losing the lawsuit at 69% or higher, and

177. To simplify matters, this hypothetical assumes a flat cost curve.
178. Firm A used to earn a net profit of $5000.
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thus that the expected likelihood that Firm A is correct in its claims of
patent infringement falls somewhere in the range of 69% to 80%.
Extrapolating a range of expected probabilities for the lawsuit from the
parties' own course of dealing may only work in a limited number of very
simple infringement suits. Many factors may complicate the analysis and
render the extrapolation of values too difficult or inaccurate to be of use to
a court or enforcement agency. For example, if the settlement takes place
early in the lawsuit and the parties are thereby able to avoid substantial
litigation fees, adding the avoided costs as a bilateral incentive to settle the
lawsuit broadens the range of the imputed value of the lawsuit.'79
Similarly, if the trial date is years away, the defendant's incentives to settle
may be higher since the patentee's loss of monopoly rents may exceed the
defendant's gains from remaining on the market during the pendency of
the lawsuit.' If the plaintiff claims willful infringement, the parties will
have to factor in the possibility that the patentee will be permitted to
recover treble damages and its attorney's fees.' Further, the parties may
have strategic reasons for settling the lawsuit-such as shareholder
pressure, management incentive compensation or risk aversion, or ongoing
business relationships with the other party-that cloud the neatness of the
settlement numbers in extrapolating an expected probability. In many
cases, it may be virtually impossible to calculate the expected future life
of the patent, given uncertainty over future technological changes or
consumer preferences. Finally, many of the factors necessary to do the
calculation may be unavailable. For example, if the defendant has not yet
entered the market, calculating the patentee's loss of market share or the
decline in price
of the patented good due to competition may be overly
2
speculative.1
One question important both to the approach described in this part and
to the "quick look" approach is the dividing line between permissible and

179. In the hypothetical, assuming that each side expected to incur an additional $2000 in
litigation costs for litigating the case on the merits, $2000 should be subtracted from A's value of
the lawsuit and added to B's negative value from the lawsuit. In the settlement described above, this
would mean that the $640 payment by A to B would represent an admission by A that its likelihood
of success was 89% or less ($15,360/$17,200) and an admission by B that its likelihood of failure
was 59% or greater.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
181. See supra note 176.
182. It would be virtually impossible to calculate a probability percentage of patentee success
on the merits if the alleged infringer asserted a Walker Process antitrust counterclaim. The
counterclaim would turn on some factors independent from the infringement claim, and the
existence of the independent variable would make isolating the value of the infringement suit
difficult at best.
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impermissible settlements. Below what percentage probability that the
patentee will prevail on the merits should an exit payment be declared
anticompetitive? Since calculating the relevant likelihood is far from an
exact science-whatever method the court or agency may employ-and
weighing the competing costs of permitting or prohibiting exit payments'
is also inexact, stating the applicable rule in terms of a precise percentage
makes little sense. Given the inherent imprecision in the general
cost/benefit analysis and in identifying the likely outcome of a lawsuit, it
may be sufficient to say that exit payments generally should be permitted
when the patentee's probability of success is "high" and prohibited when
the patentee's likelihood of success is "low."
In practice, application of this standard would probably turn into
something akin to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard used in
civil litigation or the "reasonable likelihood of success" standard used for
preliminary injunctions, both of which generally require a tipping of the
scales, or a 51% probability." 3 This probably is a more sensible place to
draw the line than higher standards of proof such as "beyond a reasonable
doubt" or "clear and convincing," particularly if the grant of a preliminary
injunction upon a "reasonable likelihood" showing is sufficient to permit
an exit payment.

183. Exactly how high a likelihood of success the plaintiff must prove to secure a preliminary
injunction remains murky. Some federal circuits require a legal "probability," i.e., a likelihood in
excess of 50%. E.g., Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1998). Others appear to hold that a
preliminary injunction may issue with even a lesser showing. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n
v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Judge Posner's famous preliminary
injunction formula-requiring the grant of a preliminary injunction "if the harm to the plaintiff if
the injunction is denied, multiplied by the probability that the denial would be an error,... exceeds
the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted, multiplied by the probability that granting
the injunction would be an error" explicitly permits the grant of preliminary injunction even where
the probability that the plaintiff's claims will succeed is below 50%. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v.
Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986). The Federal Circuit, which has jurisdiction
over patent claims, has not articulated a clear standard. See New Eng. Braiding Co. v. A.W.
Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 883 n.5 (1992) (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 n.54 (2d ed. 1983), for the proposition that
"[sltatements as to the quantum or sufficiency of the showing take a variety of formulations, e.g.,
from restrictive statements such as 'reasonable certainty,' 'strong probability,' 'substantial
likelihood,' to merely a'reasonable possibility' or 'probable chance."'); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes
Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578 n.] (Fed. Cir. 1983) (declining to adopt any particular standard of
proof). The court has also suggested that the required percentage may slide with the showing of
other factors, such as public interest and degree of harm to each party. Mikohn Gaming Corp. v.
Acres Gaming, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20983, *4-5 (D. Nev. July 10, 1998); New Eng.
Braiding,970 F.2d at 883 n.5. Semantics aside, the test in actual application probably falls near the
"probability" mark. See Mikohn Gaming, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20984 at *5-6.
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4. Settlements Imposing Barriers to Third Parties
Carefully Scrutinized
Even in cases involving meritorious claims of infringement, settlement
-agreements imposing substantial barriers to entry on third parties should
be closely scrutinized. In the interest of preserving its monopoly, the
patentee may seek to construct the settlement agreement so as to eliminate
competition not only by the infringing defendants, but also by third parties
against whom the patentee would have less certain claims of infringement.
However, not every patent infringement settlement that makes it more
likely that the patentee will prevail in an infringement suit against third
parties should be condemned on that ground. Settlements that merely
require the settling infringer's cooperation in suits by the patentee against
third parties or otherwise enhance the patentee's position in litigation
against third parties should be viewed with agnosticism from an antitrust
perspective.
An example of unjustified hostility to the consolidation of the settling
parties' resources to be used in patent infringement litigation against third
parties is found in Singer. 4 There, the cross-licensing by the European
patentees had enabled Singer, the only American manufacturer, to seek
protection under the Tariff Act of 1930185 against the Japanese importers.'86
Specifically, Singer sought an order barring imports of sewing machines
coming within the claims of one of the cross-licensed patents. 87 Since only
an American company had standing to bring such an action, the crosslicensing agreements enabled the settling parties to consolidate their legal
efforts against the Japanese in an attempt "to bar [the Japanese] infringers
in one sweep."' 88 The Supreme Court viewed this fact as probative of an
antitrust conspiracy by the patent infringement litigants.' 89
Significantly, the anticompetitive effect of the cross-licensing
settlements envisioned by the Court-an order by the President barring the
importation of infringing sewing machines-would only occur if, after a
full hearing before the United States International Trade Commission, the

184. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
185. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000).
186. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 187-88, 195-96 (1963). Although both
Japanese and European importers were included in Singer's application to the United States Tariff
Commission, the Court found that "the allegations were clearly beamed at the infringing Japanese
machines to which Singer attributed the destruction of all American domestic household sewing
machine companies save itself." Id. at 196.
187. Id. at 188.
188. Id. at 195.
189. Id.
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Japanese imports were found to be infringing. 9 °Thus, while the settlement
agreements created the possibility that the United States government would
throw its weight behind the infringement claims of the settling parties, it
did not alter the substantivenature of the infringement claims. The barrier
to Japanese competition created by the settlement was nothing more than
an increase in the probability that the Japanese imports would be found to
be infringing due to the participation of the Government.' 9'
That fact, standing alone, provides little basis for calling the settlement
anticompetitive. Parties with aligned interests frequently pool resources to
increase the efficiency or probability of success of litigation positions.
Multiple alleged patent infringers may themselves pool their resources to
resist a patent infringement claim. 92 If, in fact, the Japanese imports
infringed the U.S. patents, there would have been a social cost in not
banning their import. Increasing the probability that a meritorious claim of
patent infringement will succeed is socially beneficial, although increasing
the probability that a weak claim of patent infringement will succeed is
socially costly. The mere increase in the probability that the infringement
claim will succeed-without knowing anything about the merits of the
claim-tells93 us little in evaluating the competitive effects of the
1
settlement.

190. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(I)(B)(i) (2000). An import could be barred by order of the President
if it "infringe[d] a valid and enforceable United States patent." Id. Before such an order could be
entered, the alleged infringerwas entitled to notice and a hearing in which"[a]ll legal and equitable
defenses may be presented." Id. § 1337(c).
191. As Herbert Hovenkamp observes, "[tlhe crux of the complaint [in Singer] was that by
pooling their claims and defending validity jointly against the Japanese, rather than vis-a-vis one
another, the defendant and its fellow participants violated the Sherman Act." XII HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

2043, at 240 (1999).
192. See Jeffrey T. Haley, StrategiesandAntitrust Limitationsfor Multiple PotentialPatent
Infringers, 21 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 327, 328 (1993). Such resource pooling by patent
infringement defendants may itself raise antitrust concerns. Id.
193. The merits of the underlying patent infringement claim and the legality under the
Sherman Act of the settling defendant's agreement to support the plaintiff's claim of patent
infringement against third parties are often interrelated. In a recent case, In re Buspirone Patent
Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), plaintiffs alleged that defendant Bristol-Myers,
producer of the brand-name busiprone drug, paid co-defendant Schein Pharmaceuticals $72.5
million to admit that its generic busiprone infringed Bristol-Myer's patent and to exit the market
"even though both parties knew that the [patent] was not valid." Id. at 366. Schein then allegedly
"help[ed] maintain a public perception that [Bristol-Myer's patent] was valid." Id.The district court
dismissed the private plaintiffs' claims as time-barred. Id. at 380. However, in February 2000, thirty
states amended their complaints to assert similar Sherman Act claims. Id.at 366 n.2. If, in fact, the
patent claims were unfounded and the settling parties knew it, the exiting defendant's agreement
was to help perpetuate a falsehood and thereby discourage competition from reaching the market.
Conversely, if the patent was valid, the defendant's agreement to help educate other potential
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Singer's approach paints with too broad a brush. Under some
circumstances, however, patent settlement agreements that create barriers
to entry by third parties may impose unwarranted social costs. That may
have been the case in several recent government and private actions against
patent settlements between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical firms.
The pharmaceutical settlement cases require a rudimentary
understanding of the workings of a fourth body of public policy-the
regulatory policies concerning the marketing of pharmaceutical products
under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration. The HatchWaxman Act 9 4 establishes a regulatory regime designed to encourage the
entry of generic drugs into the market, while respecting the patent rights
of the brand-name manufacturers. 9 Under the Act, a firm may seek to
market a generic version of a branded drug by filing an Abbreviated New
Drug Approval form (ANDA) with the FDA, certifying that the generic
version is bioequivalent to the branded version'96 and that the generic
version does not infringe the branded firm's patent, or that the patent is
invalid.'97 If the holder of the patent rights files suit within 45 days after
the filing of an ANDA, FDA approval of the generic drug is automatically
stayed until the earlier of thirty months or ajudicial determination that the
patent is invalid or not infringed.'98 Significantly, the Hatch-Waxman Act
provides a 180-day exclusivity period for the first generic firm to file an
ANDA-during that period, no other generic firm may obtain FDA
approval of its own generic drug.'9 9
In two recent settlement agreements condemned as anticompetitive, the
patented brand-name firm settled an infringement action by paying the
generic firm a monthly or quarterly fee to stay off the market during the
pendency of the litigation.0 0 Significantly, in both cases the generic firm
agreed not only to exit or otherwise stay offthe market, but also agreed not
to waive its statutory 180-day period of exclusivity. 20 ' As the FTC put it in

infringers served a valuable social function.
194. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc
(1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271,282 (1994)).
195. See generallyGeraldJ. Mossinghott, Striking the Right BalanceBetween Innovationand
Drug Price Competition: Understandingthe Hatch-Waxman Act, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 187 (1994).
196. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
197. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)(II).
198. Id. § 3550)(5)(B)(iii).
199. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
200. In re Abbott Labs. & Geveva Pharms., No. C-3945, 2000 FTC LEXIS 65 (FTC May 22,
2000); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
201. In re Abbott Labs., 2000 FTC LEXIS 65 at *9; Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. at 704.
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its In re Abbott Laboratories complaint, "th[is] agreement created a
bottleneck that prevented any other potential competitors from entering the
market, because no other ANDA filer could obtain FDA approval until
Geneva's 180 day exclusivity period expired."20 2
Unlike the barrier to third party success condemned in
Singer 2 03 -which merely made it more likely that the settling parties'
infringement claims would succeed-the effect of the agreement in In re
Abbott Laboratoriesand Cardizem was to ensure monopoly rents, and
associated deadweight losses, for a period of at least six months, whether
or not any other potential new entrant had valid grounds for challenging
the brand-name firm's monopoly." 4 Even if permitting the settlement
between the particular litigants-including payments from the incumbent
to the new entrant to exit the market-were otherwise socially optimal, the
blocking effect on third-party challenges to the patent monopoly raises
serious concerns. For instance, the first generic to file an ANDA might
have had a very weak defense against the brand-name firm's infringement
suit, whereas a different potential entrant might have had a much stronger
defense based on its own formulation of the product. By settling the case
with the weaker challenger, the brand-name firm might be able to stave off
a meritorious challenge to its patent monopoly from a stronger
challenger." 5
Courts and the agencies should be wary of settlements such as these
that require both the defendant's exit from the market and make any other
challenge to the patent monopoly impossible for some extended period of
time. The possibility that a subsequent new entrant may have a better
defense against the infringement claim provides a strong reason to disallow
settlements that block a third party's entry altogether (even if only for a
limited period of time). Using the approach suggested in this article, a
202. In re Abbott Labs., 2000 FTC LEXIS 65 at *28.
203. See generally United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
204. See generally In re Abbott Labs., 2000 FTC LEXIS 65; Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 682.
205. Various bills to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act are currently pending in Congress. Bills
sponsored by Senators Charles Schumer and John McCain and Representatives Jo Ann Emerson
and Sherrod Brown, would alter the Act in two significant ways for antitrust purposes. Greater
Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S.812, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1862, 107th Cong.
(2001). First, the bills would eliminate the 30-month automatic stay of ANDA approval while the
patentee pursues infringement litigation. S.812, § 6(b); H.R. 1862, § 6(b). Second, and more
significantly, the bills would make the 180-day period of exclusivity conditional on the generic firm
actually marketing a generic equivalent. S. 812, § 3(a)(c); H.R. 1862 § 3(a)(c). This "use it or lose
it" provision would solve the concern identified in the FTC cases discussed in this Article-that
by settling an infringement action by agreeing to exit the market, the first generic to file for an
ANDA could also block any other firm's ability to challenge the patentee's monopoly for six
months.
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court might permit an exit payment settlement agreement following the
grant of a preliminary injunction against the first defendant to be sued. But
that settlement should not be permitted to block an attempt to enter the
market by another firm with a more meritorious challenge to the
infringement claim. Otherwise, the patentee might be able to maintain its
monopoly without further challenge based on the happenstance that the
first firm to reach the market had a weak defense to the patentee's
infringement claim." 6 Whereas otherwise permissible settlement
agreements increase the difficulty of third-party challenges, courts should
examine them to ensure that the parties have not effectively bargained
away the ability of third parties to enter-the market.
Patent infringement settlements that increase the difficulty of third
party challenges to the patentee's monopoly should be scrutinized
carefully. But the fact that the settlement strengthens the patentee's
monopoly does not provide a complete answer to the question of whether
the settlement is anticompetitive, since strengthening a patentee's valid
infringement claims enhances the social interest reflected in the patent
laws. This factor should be considered in the context of a broader
framework for assessing the competitive effects of patent settlements.
The mere fact that a settlement agreement in some way decreases the
probability that third parties will prevail in challenging the patentee's
monopoly does not, by itself, suffice to condemn the settlement. If it is
highly probable that the infringement claim against the settling defendant
is good and the other potential defendants stand in the same posture as the
settling defendant (i.e., make similar use of the plaintiffs invention and
have similar defenses to an infringement suit), then the fact that the
settlement increases the probability that other firms may be deterred from
infringing the patent or lose an infringement lawsuit is socially beneficial.
A settlement agreement that protects the incentive reward granted by
patent law should not be condemned. Thus, if it is established that the
patentee's infringement claim is probably good, an agreement by the
infringer to cooperate with the patentee in infiingement suits against third
parties, to make a public admission that its use infringed, or similarly to aid
the patentee's infringement claims should be permitted.

206. Depending on the nature of the barrier to entry created by the settlement, the patentee
may be able to continue its monopoly despite the existence of strong possible challenges by
selecting an initial defendant with weak defenses, settling, and then using the first settlement to
ward off entry by stronger challengers.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The public policies granting patent monopolies, favoring settlements,
and disallowing market division agreements can and should be reconciled
in the context of patent infringement settlements involving the allegedly
infringing firm's discontinuance of the allegedly infringing use. Sound
public policy must begin with a recognition of the substantial social costs
on both sides of the equation-both to permitting and to prohibiting exit
payments. An effort must then be made to formulate rules that permit exit
payments when prohibiting them would be most costly, and to prohibit
them when permitting them would be most costly.
This Article has argued, not surprisingly, that the chief indicator of
these competing costs is the merit of the patentee's infringement claim.
Exit payments should therefore be permitted when the patentee's claims
appear ex ante to have substantial merit and disallowed when they are
likely to fail. The legal system must make this determination of merit
without engaging in a full-blown adjudication, which itself would trigger
many of the avoidable costs of disallowing exit payments.
This Article suggested several screening mechanisms that may permit
an early, and relatively low-cost, determination of the likely outcome of
the lawsuit, and formed a basis for determining the legality of an exit
payment. Other more practical and workable mechanisms may be
developed with the benefit of experience. But so long as the law continues
to favor patents, settlements, and competition, some effort to balance the
three policies by quickly analyzing the merits of the infiingement suit must
be undertaken.
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